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Article

Moral Restorative Justice: A Political
Genealogy of Activism and Neoliberalism
in the United States
Amy J. Cohen†
INTRODUCTION
Today, it is common to describe a “bipartisan consensus” on
the American criminal justice system.1 Policymakers “across the
aisle” agree that particular rules and institutions, such as abstract adjudication and determinate sentencing, should change
as they confront a crisis of incarcerated people who are not reformed by their encounters with the system.2 A critical literature
unpacks this consensus by distinguishing its “left” and “right”
articulations. Reformers on the political left, critical criminal
law scholars argue, theorize social and environmental causes of
crime and propose remedies motivated to address the racial,
† John C. Elam/Vorys Sater Professor of Law, The Ohio State University
Moritz College of Law. For conversations and comments, I thank Aziza Ahmed,
Amna Akbar, Benjamin Berger, Doug Berman, John Braithwaite, Ruth Colker,
Aya Gruber, Deval Desai, Joshua Dressler, Malcolm Feeley, Ilana Gershon,
Leigh Goodmark, Timothy Hedeen, Genevieve Lakier, Benjamin Levin, David
Levin, Vincent Lloyd, Joseph Margulies, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Allegra
McLeod, Harry Mika, Judith Resnik, Jennifer Reynolds, Shannon Sliva, Marc
Spindelman, Mark Umbreit, Isaac Weiner, and Douglas Yarn. For research and
bibliographic assistance, I thank Ali Anderson, Seth Barany, Brandon Miller,
and Will White. Errors, of course, are mine. Copyright © 2019 by Amy J. Cohen.
1. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: New Approaches to a
Growing Problem, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 529, 534 (2012). Podgor puts
the point dramatically: “Perhaps what has been the most impressive aspect of
this movement [to stop overcriminalization] is that it has no political or ideological colors. Its voice comes from the left, the right, Democrats, Republicans . . . .”
Id.
2. A recent, if incremental, example: in December 2018, a large majority
of the Senate voted to relax some federal mandatory minimum sentencing laws
and enable some federal prisoners to earn earlier release. First Step Act of 2018,
S. 756, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted).

889

890

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:889

class-based, and gendered inequalities and violence perpetuated
by the penal system.3 By contrast, reformers on the political
right are seen primarily as advancing economic rationalities encapsulated in the term “neoliberalism”: cost-benefit analysis,
public choice theory, and managerial and actuarial logics applied
to social problems—what Allegra McLeod calls “neoliberal penal
reform” and describes as “decarceration as a component of a regressive fiscal program”;4 or what Hadar Aviram calls “fiscal
prudence rather than humanitarian concern” and argues stands
to retrench a “neoliberal framework.”5 Summarizing such analyses, Benjamin Levin describes the (radical) left as offering “ideological critique of neoliberalism,” including how the criminal
justice system reflects structural inequalities, whereas the center and right care mostly about using resources efficiently—
“right sizing” the penal system so that public costs are calibrated
more precisely to public goods.6
These arguments hold important explanatory power—they
illustrate how this present moment of so-called bipartisan reform may in practice conserve rather than transform existing
systems. This Article, however, asks: how is this analysis of centrist and right-wing economic motivations incomplete? By describing mainstream penal reform as a series of rational calculations, left analysts stand to miss how economic and moral
logics are often deeply intertwined. Or to put this inquiry an-

3. See Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform,
117 MICH. L. REV. 259, 272–73 (2018).
4. Allegra M. McLeod, Beyond the Carceral State, 95 TEX. L. REV. 651, 656
(2017).
5. HADAR AVIRAM, CHEAP ON CRIME: RECESSION-ERA POLITICS AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT 58, 98 (2015). This neoliberal
framework, Aviram explains, includes “the retreat of the state from its caretaking function, the despair of rehabilitative goals, and the focus on profitable and
managerial goals.” Id. at 98. For other critiques of the bipartisan consensus and
specifically its focus on fiscal concerns, see generally MARIE GOTTSCHALK,
CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS
(2015); Katherine Beckett, Anna Reosti & Emily Knaphus, The End of an Era?
Understanding the Contradictions of Criminal Justice Reform, 664 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 238, 250 (2016); Marie Gottschalk, Bring It On: The
Future of Penal Reform, the Carceral State, and American Politics, 12 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 559 (2015); and Carl Takei, From Mass Incarceration to Mass Control, and Back Again: How Bipartisan Criminal Justice Reform May Lead to a
For-Profit Nightmare, 20 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 125 (2017).
6. Levin, supra note 3, at 273.
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other way, if, as critical scholars argue, bipartisan criminal justice reform is constrained by limited forms of public redistribution and little structural transformation—that is, if bipartisan
reform is “still neoliberal”—then this Article suggests we should
investigate American neoliberalism not simply for its economic
but also for its moral character.
To illustrate some of the moral logics animating penal reform, this Article pursues a genealogy of restorative justice—a
decarceral strategy that today elicits support across the aisle.
Restorative justice is a mediative process that invites offenders
to directly experience the effects of their crime through conversations with victims (as well as through conversations with family and community members convened into “conferences” or “circles”), and then to deliberate about how to repair such effects
through emotional, spiritual, and material reparations.7 It originated (in its contemporary form) in the last decades of the twentieth century primarily (but never exclusively) on the political
left. But in the United States it has only ever limped along at the
margins of the criminal justice system. This is because its found-

7. In this Article, I describe restorative justice as a mediative process, although I recognize that restorative justice differs from classic forms of civil mediation. Significantly, in most restorative processes an offender must concede
the alleged harm as a precondition to dialogue with a victim. Some restorative
processes, however, “allow for acceptance of responsibility to emerge” through a
continuing set of facilitated conversations “rather than requir[e] [responsibility]
to be established at the outset.” Barbara Hudson, Restorative Justice and Gendered Violence: Diversion or Effective Justice?, 42 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 616,
625 (2002). As such, restorative processes vary in how much mediation, dispute
resolution, and consensual agreement they incorporate. For example, participants engaged in a violent conflict may themselves attempt to reach a consensus
about what harm occurred. Or, more commonly, the fact of harm is stipulated,
and an offender and victim may instead attempt to reach a consensus about
what sort of restitution the offender should offer to meet the victim’s needs. Or
harm is stipulated, and a victim along with community members and criminal
justice professionals may deliberate about restitution and jointly reach a decision that an offender may accept. For an argument to expand the range of cases
where restorative justice looks more like mediation (that is, a process where
parties can “discuss the facts of the case, relative culpability, and a range of
outcomes”), see M. Eve Hanan, Decriminalizing Violence: A Critique of Restorative Justice and Proposal for Diversionary Mediation, 46 N.M. L. Rev. 123, 155
(2016).
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ing theorists and practitioners rejected, as far as they could, either a rational or pathologized penal subject.8 Restorativists instead willed a different human into being: what John
Braithwaite calls a “virtuous actor”9—that is, a moral agent who
has lost her way, often in the face of excessive individualism and
social disintegration, yet who may re-biography herself as an accountable, redeemable subject especially when reintegrated into
“communities of care.”10 For this reason, restorativists often argue that deterrent strategies (which presume a rational actor)
and incapacitative strategies (which presume a pathological actor) should be the exception, not the rule.11 Restorativists would
instead institutionalize strong disciplinary forms of informal social control designed to inspire ethical feeling and moral accountability, which in turn requires keeping offenders, as far as possible, “in communities.” This is why restorative justice is
potentially significantly decarceral.
In the United States today, restorative justice is gaining
supporters on the political right, including among Republican
policymakers, evangelical conservative Christians, and libertarian organizations funded by the Charles Koch Foundation.12 As

8. See, e.g., JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A REMARKABLE COURT DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA 23 (2014)
(describing the late twentieth century “common sense” understanding of criminals that fueled mass incarceration: that “most criminals have a high and unchanging potential for criminal activity, including violence”).
9. John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, 25 CRIME & JUST. 1, 61 (1999).
10. John Braithwaite & Kathleen Daly, Masculinities, Violence and Communitarian Control, in JUST BOYS DOING BUSINESS?: MEN, MASCULINITIES,
AND CRIME 189, 201 (Tim Newburn & Elizabeth A. Stanko eds., 1994).
11. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION 42 (2002); Braithwaite, supra note 9, at 60–67; see also RON CLAASSEN,
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 2 (1996) (“Restorative Justice prefers that offenders who pose significant safety risks and are not yet cooperative be placed in settings where the emphasis is on safety, values, ethics,
responsibility, accountability, and civility. They should be exposed to the impact
of their crime(s) on victims, invited to learn empathy, and offered learning opportunities to become better equipped with skills to be a productive member of
society. They should continually be invited (not coerced) to become cooperative
with the community and be given the opportunity to demonstrate this in appropriate settings as soon as possible.”); HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW
FOCUS FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE 221 (1990) (“What do we do with the ‘dangerous
few’? Do we incarcerate?”).
12. See infra Part III.
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an uptick in legislation suggests, restorative justice is also increasingly promoted from within state institutions. For example,
between 2010 and 2015, fifteen states enacted or updated restorative justice statutes13—lawmaking that Shannon Sliva argues
cannot be predicted by political party affiliation.14 Of course, and
notwithstanding this activity, there is no such thing as bipartisan restorative justice. Restorativists on the left and right have
very different views about, for example, the mediation of violent
versus nonviolent crime, state versus community control over
mediative processes, and the relationship between individual
harm and structural change.15 But in all versions of restorative
justice—and driving its institutionalization—proponents agree
that crime is often foundationally an interpersonal harm that
requires intensely personalized and relational processes in response. As such, this Article also asks: why is restorative justice’s ethic of relationality mainstreaming now?
The answer is complex. Over the last several decades, policy
elites have combined an economistic approach to crime control
with a particular moral strategy: legitimating sovereign power
through populist punitivity, costs be damned.16 Today, however,
the American penal state is confronting the limits of “harsh justice.”17 Rather than double down on the moral righteousness of
punishment or retreat to post-war rehabilitative and welfarist
penal policies, restorative justice potentially enables something
different. It invites policymakers to institutionalize spaces of
ethical feeling and action where offenders can experience personal transformations through values such as responsibility, forgiveness, and grace. Restorative justice appeals today across the
13. SHANNON M. SLIVA, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE LEGISLATIVE TRENDS,
https://www.rjcolorado.org/_literature_153668/Restorative_Justice_
Legislation_Trends [https://perma.cc/PN6V-WBJF].
14. Shannon M. Sliva, Finally “Changing Lenses”? State-Level Determinants of Restorative Justice Laws, 98 PRISON J. 519, 535 (2018) (“The hypothesis
that a higher percentage of Democratic [compared to Republican] legislators
would be associated with more supportive restorative justice legislation was rejected.”).
15. Many left restorativists describe struggles for restorative justice and
struggles for structural transformations as advancing the same overarching social and political ends. See infra notes 165–70, 292–304 and accompanying text.
16. See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL
ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 131–35 (2001).
17. See generally JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003).
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aisle, I will thus argue, because it offers a distinctively moral
form of neoliberalism.18 It offers a way of living under late capitalist conditions that is not competitive or self-interested, but intensely solicitous and caring, and caring not just for the self but
especially for others: offenders, victims, families, community
members, mediators, prosecutors, social workers are all supposed to restore interpersonal relationships and—through these
relationships—produce new (or old) forms of social cohesion necessary to scale back the penal and the social state.19 Or to put
this argument another way, today libertarian reformers increasingly claim that skepticism of state intervention in social welfare
systems and in penal corrections should be mutually reinforcing
political commitments.20 Such reformers, however, know well
that accomplishing effective community self-regulation requires
a private sphere saturated with moral-relational values, not
simply rational atomized individualism.
This Article begins by elaborating the terms “restorative justice” and “neoliberalism” conceptually to trace points of convergence and divergence between them. Part II unpacks the development of restorative justice in the United States genealogically,
starting in the 1970s with its modern institutional roots in the
community mediation movement and its attack on centralized,
expert state adjudication. In the 1980s and 1990s, as civil mediation morphed from community empowerment into marketmanagerial practices, early restorativists infused criminal mediation with an intrinsically moral-relational dimension. They set
relationality against retributive, rehabilitative, and deterrencebased theories of incarceration, which influential restorative
theorists also tethered to left-progressive efforts to challenge status quo social and economic inequalities. This moral-relational
dimension made restorative justice far more marginal than civil

18. I borrow this term (and a heuristic distinction between “market neoliberalism” and “moral neoliberalism”) from ANDREA MUEHLEBACH, THE MORAL
NEOLIBERAL: WELFARE AND CITIZENSHIP IN ITALY 19–20 (2012).
19. See id. at 6–7.
20. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan & Carl Hulse, Republicans and Democrats Cannot Agree on Absolutely Anything. Except This., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/us/prison-reform-bill-republicans
-democrats.html [https://perma.cc/N768-2UUP] (describing the views of Marc
Levin who spearheaded criminal justice programming as part of the libertarian
Texas Public Policy Foundation and co-founded the think tank Right on Crime).
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mediation in American judicial institutions, but it also made restorative justice available for new translations.
Part III examines these translations. Around the millennium, a number of criminal law scholars proposed fusing restoration with retributivism so that practices of apology and forgiveness could temper rather than decenter traditional
punishment theories. Important Christian conservatives evolved
their own version of retributive-restorative justice consistent
with political commitments to small government, voluntary care,
and personal transformation against sin. As the crisis of mass
incarceration chipped away at American faith in penal harshness, these reformist ideas became broadly available for bipartisan policy uptake—influencing, for example, efforts to enact
statewide victim-offender mediation in Texas that yoke arguments for healing and relationality together with arguments for
cost-cutting and a smaller social state.
This Article thus offers a cautionary tale about American
restorative justice consistent with arguments that doubt today’s
bipartisan consensus. It also, however, complicates left criticisms of that bipartisan consensus. When left scholars set humanitarian concerns against efficiency, particular arguments
follow: often we criticize economic logics and debate strategic
partnerships with clear expectations about the limits of fiscally
oriented reform. By contrast, this Article illustrates how a reform agenda characterized by repeated arguments about fiscal
prudence may at times rely deeply on moral-relational ideals—
ideals that do not necessarily contradict but for some may instead advance political commitments to shrinking state care and
public provisioning. As such, restorative justice invites political
rivals to support values such as relationality and mutual aid
that they may genuinely share—at the same time as these values
may be ruthlessly competing for very different overarching normative political, economic, and social visions.
I. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND NEOLIBERALISM: A
CONCEPTUAL SKETCH
In the United States, modern restorative principles originated in experiments in informal justice in the 1970s, which
shared ideas in common with a broader attack on the criminal
justice system—ideas that in the 1980s paradoxically helped to
consolidate the harsh penal regime that Americans have today.
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For example, early restorativists expressed skepticism about
professional state-administered treatment and rehabilitation.
Instead, they commended governing through community and devolving responsibility from state to private actors to manage
questions of crime and justice. In this Part, I lay out basic restorative principles—subsidiarity, active responsibilization, and an
ethic of relationality—as they were articulated by founding
scholars working in multiple national contexts. To make sense
of potential synergies between restorative justice and neoliberalism, I then offer a perspective on neoliberalism that does not
reduce primarily to a set of coherent arguments about rational
economics.
A. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
Subsidiarity first.21 In 1977, Norwegian criminologist Nils
Christie published a still-foundational essay, Conflicts as Property.22 Christie argued that advanced industrialized states deprive citizens of a critical resource—conflicts—which citizens
rightfully “own” and should be entitled to use to elaborate their
own norms and social relationships.23 To that end, Christie extensively criticized professional, statist forms of expertise and
called instead for “lay-oriented” courts that would stage intensely personalized encounters between victims and offenders.24

21. I use the term subsidiarity here not simply to suggest decentralization
but also to capture some of its meaning as a moral principle rooted in Catholic
social thought, namely, that people should balance personal responsibility and
dignity with the common good through plural social processes, associations, and
forms—and that government should therefore take care not to replace the ends
of individuals and smaller associations. For an extensive explication, see Joseph
Drew & Bligh Grant, Subsidiarity: More than a Principle of Decentralization—
A View from Local Government, 47 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 552 (2017). See also
Yishai Blank, Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role of Local Governments in
an Age of Global Multilevel Governance, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509 (2010); David Golemboski, Federalism and the Catholic Principle of Subsidiarity, 45 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 526 (2015).
22. Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1977);
see, e.g., Braithwaite, supra note 9, at 5 (calling Conflicts as Property “[t]he most
influential text of the restorative tradition”).
23. Christie, supra note 22, at 3–4, 7–8.
24. Id. at 10–11.
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This theory of subsidiarity—redistributing responsibility for
crime and justice from the state to associations of private actors—presupposed a corresponding theory of subjectivity. Christie, and the many restorativists who followed him, envisioned
active, engaged citizens who could govern themselves to a far
greater extent than the state allowed. Christie criticized how the
then-dominant ethos of rehabilitation reduced offenders to “object[s] for study, manipulation and control.”25 Whatever externalizing theory the professional applied to understand crime,
Christie argued—be it biology, personality, or even, as Christie
was more sympathetic to, class—the focus on social explanation
took interpersonal conflicts away from the parties themselves.26
Christie wanted to ask more of offenders. He presumed a moral
agent, rather than a dependent or pathological subject, who
could meaningfully experience blame and accountability and
therefore could actively discuss and make reparations—processes that Christie advocated wholly apart from any “interest
in the treatment or improvement of criminals” or reduced recidivism rates (he was instead after citizen engagement and bottom-up norm elaboration).27 John Braithwaite, another foundational restorative theorist, made a similar claim: “restorative
justice involves a shift from passive responsibility to which offenders are held by professionals for something they have done
in the past to citizens taking active responsibility for making
things right into the future.”28
Restorativists also want to ask more from victims. If state
criminal justice systems make offenders into “things,” they erase
victims entirely, Christie argued.29 Victims are “so thoroughly
represented,” he elaborated, that they lose doubly in the professional system: “first vis-à-vis the offender, but secondly and often
in a more crippling manner by being denied rights to full participation in what might have been one of the more important ritual
encounters in life.”30 Restorativists thus reject the idea that the
state—as the proper institutional representation of “society” or
25. Id. at 5.
26. Id. (“They are class conflicts—also. But, by stressing this, the conflicts
are again taken away from the directly involved parties.”).
27. Id. at 9.
28. John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and De-Professionalization, 13
GOOD SOC’Y 28, 28 (2004).
29. Christie, supra note 22, at 5.
30. Id. at 3.
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the public good—should stand for victims. They instead envision
(not uncontroversially) victims who want to take personal responsibility for directly communicating the effects of a criminal
act through highly personalized and affective narratives.
Finally, relationality. Restorativists argue for decentralized
problem-solving by active participants because they conceptualize crime as foundationally a cause and effect of broken relationships. What is to be “restored” are the interpersonal relationships broken—or created—by crime. As such, restorative justice
seeks to “transcend the merely rational to speak to vital concerns
of human conscience” such as love, forgiveness, and grace.31
Hence, in restorative interventions, “superimposed upon the
stick and the carrot lies ‘the sermon.’”32 As Adam Crawford explains, “[t]he motivation evoked here is rooted not in evading a
punishment or seeking to obtain a reward but in avoiding feeling
bad or fostering commitments to do the right thing.”33 However
the process begins (perhaps through offender and victim calculations of self-interest), the restorativist’s hope is always that it
will involve genuine transformations in self and social relationships.
Restorativists thus want “less state, greater de-professionalization and a returning of conflicts to their ‘owners.’”34 But they
make this case for privatizing justice through the logics of morality and relationality as much or more than through economics—through self-interest and mutuality, through the stick/carrot and the sermon. Many early theorists grounded these double
principles in a range of value systems including Mennonite
peacebuilding and New Left traditions of participatory democracy, localism, and community self-management.35 But given
broader political trends in the United States and elsewhere in
the late twentieth century, some restorativists also began to observe uneasily that their “anti-state appeal” coincided “with a
31. John Braithwaite & Stephen Mugford, Conditions of Successful Reintegration Ceremonies: Dealing with Juvenile Offenders, 34 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 139, 155 (1994).
32. Adam Crawford, Situating Restorative Youth Justice in Crime Control
and Prevention, 2007 ACTA JURIDICA 1, 18.
33. Id.
34. Adam Crawford, The State, Community and Restorative Justice: Heresy,
Nostalgia and Butterfly Collecting, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND THE LAW 101,
112 (Lode Walgrave ed., 2002).
35. See infra Parts II.A–B.
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neo-liberal assault upon the welfare state.”36 To understand how
early restorativists could simultaneously be critical of neoliberalism and yet share some basic presuppositions in common, the
following section sets forth a perspective on neoliberalism that
does not “imagin[e] Homo economicus at the center of the
story.”37
B. MARKET NEOLIBERALISM, MORAL NEOLIBERALISM
I use the term neoliberalism in this Article with some hesitation—it’s a slippery analytic that for some readers may
threaten to obfuscate rather than clarify existing social problems
and practices. Its primary expounders such as Friedrich Hayek
and his circle of intellectual collaborators (which included
Charles Koch) aimed “to bring about the rehabilitation of the
idea of personal freedom especially in the economic realm,” a
task that they reasoned would require “purging traditional liberal theory of certain accidental accretions which have become
attached to it in the course of time” (such as a national collectivist ethos).38 Numerous scholars in turn have theorized how this
“revival”39 of liberalism intentionally reinvented it through new

36. Crawford, supra note 34, at 113.
37. Bethany E. Moreton, The Soul of Neoliberalism, 25 SOC. TEXT 103, 106
(2007). See generally MELINDA COOPER, FAMILY VALUES: BETWEEN NEOLIBERALISM AND THE NEW SOCIAL CONSERVATISM (2017); BETHANY MORETON, TO
SERVE GOD AND WAL-MART: THE MAKING OF CHRISTIAN FREE ENTERPRISE
(2010).
38. FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE FORTUNES OF LIBERALISM: ESSAYS ON AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS AND THE IDEAL OF FREEDOM 192, 237, 238, 244 (Peter G.
Klein ed., 1992). Hayek explained that “Americans have done me the honour of
considering the publication of The Road to Serfdom [1944] as the decisive date”
of the “rebirth of a liberal movement.” Id. at 192. He, however, made clear that
he roots the genesis of these ideas in the larger endeavor of the members of the
Mont Pelerin Society, a group of like-minded intellectuals that Hayek founded
and co-convened. Id. See generally Rachel S. Turner, The ‘Rebirth of Liberalism’:
The Origins of Neo-Liberal Ideology, 12 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 67 (2007). See also
DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005); THE ROAD FROM
MONT PÈLERIN: THE MAKING OF THE NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT COLLECTIVE
(Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe eds., 2009). Charles Koch attended Mont Perlin Society meetings. On Hayek’s influence on Koch, see, e.g., JANE MAYER,
DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE RISE OF
THE RADICAL RIGHT 173 (2017).
39. HAYEK, supra note 38, at 237.
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political, legal, and epistemic understandings of the purpose and
functions of markets.40
In this Article, I engage with the term neoliberalism as it is
now commonly used on the legal left—namely, as an analytic
both to trace and criticize how public and private institutions
distribute market-managerial discipline to address public problems and mold individual subjectivities.41 Hence, when critical
criminal law scholars describe reforms as neoliberal, they
broadly invoke governance practices that have expanded over
the last forty years as a counter to New Deal and Keynesianstyle institutions and especially as a counter to their redistributive potential. In brief, these practices endeavor to outsource a
range of social and political functions to nonstate actors. Outsourcing embodies a procedural and a substantive dimension. If
the question is: “Who has the institutional legitimacy and competence to provide a particular good or service, including crime
control or adjudication?,” a neoliberal approach to governance
generally favors communities, corporations, families, and individuals over state institutions. If the question is: “How should
these nonstate actors order themselves?,” a neoliberal approach
answers through market ideals such as efficiency and individual
rationality.
Hence, from this perspective, to describe criminal justice reforms as neoliberal has distinctive (not slippery) meaning: it is
to anticipate that such reforms will supplant some of the heavy40. See Turner, supra note 38, at 78. I should add: scholars have different
accounts of what justifies the prefix “neo” in neoliberalism. Some illustrate how
whereas nineteenth century liberal theorists posited that free markets occur “by
dint of nature,” neoliberal theorists understand market rationality “as achieved
and normative, as promulgated through law and through social and economic
policy.” Wendy Brown, American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism,
and De-Democratization, 34 POL. THEORY 690, 694 (2006). Other scholars suggest that the key distinction is epistemic: that neoliberal thinkers, unlike their
classical liberal predecessors, define the market as an “engine of epistemic
truth,” an information processor necessary to supplant the limits of rational human cognition. Philip Mirowski, Hell Is Truth Seen Too Late, 46 BOUNDARY 2
at 1, 5–12, 7 (2019); see also Amy J. Cohen, Governance Legalism: Hayek and
Sabel on Reason and Rules, Organization and Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 357. Finally, others propose that what makes neoliberalism distinctive from earlier
liberalisms is simply that “it comes after the twentieth-century welfare state
and is therefore confronted with the task of either overcoming its structures or
adapting them to new ends.” COOPER, supra note 37, at 314.
41. See, e.g., David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and
Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 16 (2014).
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handedness of the carceral state with, for example, publicprivate risk-management strategies benchmarked by an increase in cost savings (or in other net utilities)—but not through
the direct provisioning of public goods and services to offenders
understood as dependent subjects claiming state care and redistribution. As Marie Gottschalk puts this argument, today mainstream penal reform is “infused with the core tenets of neoliberalism,” which means “that the only penal reforms worth
pursuing are ones that save money and reduce recidivism.”42
I will call all this market neoliberalism.43 I suggest that as
an analytic, market neoliberalism fails to fully capture rightwing penal reform, particularly the rise of restorative justice
within it. The question I thus pose is: how should we think of
moral-relational values within deregulatory governance projects? By moral-relational values, I mean affective, otheroriented commitments encapsulated in terms like “care,” “empathy,” “mutual aid,” and “altruism”—values that, in essence, comprise the opposite of atomized, rational, calculating individualism.
To be sure, many scholars theorize neoliberalism as a moral
construct. But their arguments are not exactly what I am after.
For example, prominent scholars have suggested that under neoliberalism, individuals must assume moral responsibility to care
for themselves—and must do so according to market logics. Perhaps most famously, Wendy Brown reasons that the neoliberal
state cultivates, institutionalizes, and rewards practices that
comprehensively configure human beings as homo œconomicus,
casting virtually “all dimensions of human life . . . in terms of a
market rationality” and “conducted according to a calculus of
utility.”44 Brown describes this as a transformation of what it
means to be moral: under neoliberalism moral autonomy becomes the capacity to care for one’s own needs and interests, and
moral behavior becomes rational calculations about costs, benefits, and outcomes.45 Ronen Shamir reasons much the same. Neoliberalism, he argues, exhaustively transfigures deontological

42. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 5, at 79.
43. MUEHLEBACH, supra note 18, at 19–20.
44. Wendy Brown, Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy, 7
THEORY & EVENT, no. 1, 2003, ¶ 9.
45. Id.
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social-moral concerns into instrumental ones.46 As such, moral
governance does not demand obedient subjects that comply with
authoritative rules of law as much as subjects who willingly internalize self-responsibilization—that is, actors “whose moral
quality is based on the fact that they rationally assess the costs
and benefits of a certain act as opposed to other alternative acts”
and who therefore properly bear the consequences of these actions.47 In these accounts, neoliberalism means that the moral
has de-differentiated from the economic: economic processes
have become moralized as morality has become indistinguishable from economic processes.
In this Article, I pursue a different inquiry: namely, how do
moral-relational values—care of the other, not simply care of the
self—play out in neoliberal governance projects unfolding on the
ground? Here I turn to Andrea Muehlebach, who examines the
rise of voluntarism in the social services sector in Italy.48 Challenging arguments penned by Brown and others, Muehlebach
describes the expansion of governance programs that limit state
welfare and public provisioning by devolving responsibility for
care from the state onto individuals, families, and communities.49 Yet, she illustrates how the appeal and institutional
power of such governance programs come not from the fact
that economic rationalities constantly instrumentalize moralrelational ones50—that is, not from transforming care and service provision into rational self-interested utility calculations.51
To the contrary, these programs knit together what we might
think of as opposites—self-interest and compassion, instrumentality and solidarity, homo œconomicus and homo relationalis—
yet opposites contained in the same overarching belief system.52

46. Ronen Shamir, The Age of Responsibilization: On Market-Embedded
Morality, 37 ECON. & SOC’Y 1, 14 (2008).
47. Id. at 7 (quoting Thomas Lemke, ‘The Birth of Bio-politics’: Michel Foucault’s Lecture at the Collège de France on Neo-liberal Governmentality, 30
ECON. & SOC’Y 190, 201 (2001)).
48. See generally MUEHLEBACH, supra note 18.
49. Id. at 24.
50. Id. at 23–25.
51. See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN
BEHAVIOR (1976).
52. MUEHLEBACH, supra note 18, at 6–9; Andrea Muehlebach, Complexio
Oppositorum: Notes on the Left in Neoliberal Italy, 21 PUB. CULTURE 495, 499
(2009).
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They tether homo œconomicus to a web of moral-relational ideals. And they suggest that how deregulatory and fiscally conservative political projects play out may depend crucially on the
distribution of empathy and altruism, not simply market rationality.53
I will thus use Muehlebach’s term moral neoliberalism to
describe a different facet of contemporary bipartisan penal reform. In the story I tell, actors bent on advancing “economic freedom” and “less state” are underwritten by robust other-oriented
forms of Christian morality and values such as empathy and forgiveness. The confluence of these forces has produced a version
of restorative justice that today is embraced on the libertarian
and conservative right. It has some early roots, but as we shall
see, it was for a long time marginal—many prominent early restorativists instead hoped to advance left redistributivist politics.
II. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN THE SHADOW OF
AMERICAN PENAL TRANSFORMATIONS: 1970s–2000s
“In the beginning,” Paul McCold observes, “mediation was
restorative justice, and restorative justice was mediation.”54 I
begin with restorative justice’s modern institutional roots in
American community mediation both because it is accurate and
because it prefigures three (sometimes overlapping, sometimes
competing) aspirations for mediation that continue to repeat
throughout restorative justice today. The first is structural,
namely, aspirations to use mediation to promote social justice
and societal transformations. The second is relational, namely,
aspirations to use mediation to nurture the expression of values

53. I should add: scholars such as Brown theorize how neoliberalism—described as an “expressly amoral” market rationality—intersects with extrinsic
moral belief systems such as neoconservatism. Brown, supra note 40, at 692,
702. Muehlebach’s argument is different: she argues that neoliberalism itself
welds together oppositional logics, fabricating economic man and relational man
into a single moral vision. Muehlebach, supra note 52, at 495–96. In this Article,
I use Muehlebach’s term moral neoliberalism as analytical frame to describe
particular contemporary criminal justice practices unfolding on the ground, but
I do so without intervening in this conceptual disagreement about an extrinsic
versus intrinsic relationship between neoliberalism and moral systems.
54. Paul McCold, The Recent History of Restorative Justice: Mediation, Circles, and Conferencing, in HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 23, 24 (Dennis Sullivan & Larry Tifft eds., 2006).
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such as empathy, care, and other-oriented spiritual commitments. The third is about economic liberty and efficiency,
namely, aspirations to use mediation to enable individuals to
bargain to solve their own problems and, in so doing, to save judicial resources and rationalize public systems.55
In this Part, my overarching argument is as follows: community mediation failed to maintain a bottom-up and structurally oriented vision. But it helped spawn two distinct strands of
mediation. The first is civil mediation, which institutionalized in
the 1980s and 1990s, penetrating, even transforming, American
justice institutions. The second is restorative justice, which
achieved a low-level presence in the 1990s and aughts and is expanding its institutional reach now. Civil mediation’s success
within state institutions reflected its transformation into a set of
economic ideals: individual interest-maximization, efficiency,
and cost savings. By contrast, restorative justice’s persistent
noneconomic moral-relational ambitions meant that it stayed
marginal but also generatively indeterminate—capable of multiple articulations by reformers across a political spectrum attracted to restorative justice precisely for its moral power.

55. Several scholars have offered similar descriptions. See, e.g., ROBERT A.
BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING
TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 15–22, 24 (1994)
(distinguishing among different aspirations for mediation including party satisfaction and cost reduction; social justice including by facilitating “the organization of relatively powerless individuals into communities of interest”; and personal empowerment and recognition through moral development); Christine B.
Harrington & Sally Engle Merry, Ideological Production: The Making of Community Mediation, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 709, 714–17 (1988) (distinguishing
among the following aims for mediation: the rational delivery of dispute resolution services; social transformation; personal growth and development); Susan
Silbey & Austin Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and Legal Scholarship: From
Institutional Critique to the Reconstruction of the Juridical Subject, 66 DENV.
U. L. REV. 437, 445–58 (1989) (distinguishing among the following proponents
of mediation: the establishment bar and legal elites who wish to rationalize adjudication; access to justice proponents who wish to help the socially disadvantaged utilize state resources; and quality proponents who wish to empower individuals and communities to resolve their own conflicts); see also Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of Traditions, Ideologies, Paradigms, and Practices, 11 NEGOT. J. 217, 220 (1995) (arguing that “those of us who continue to hold a commitment to mediation as a progressive means for socially transformative ends must be ever-vigilant about our
practices and the uses to which they might be put”).
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A. THE COMMUNITY MEDIATION MOVEMENT AND THE RISE OF
CIVIL MEDIATION
The community mediation movement began on the political
left. In the late 1960s and 1970s, lawyers and activists proposed
reclaiming popular control over conflict resolution, often influenced by their experiences of the civil rights movements and
struggles for social and economic justice as well as by New Left
commitments to participatory democracy. Small experiments
emerged around the country. In 1976, for example, Raymond
Shonholtz launched the San Francisco Community Boards,56
which his contemporaries described as a prototype for the movement.57 Shonholtz repeatedly argued that lay—not formal, statist—practices of conflict resolution could return politics to the
grassroots.58 Hence, for example, the Community Boards held
mediations in public in order to create opportunities “to promote
consciousness-raising.”59 Others like Paul Wahrhaftig, whose
work on bail reform propelled his interest in community mediation, reasoned that through bottom-up dispute resolution “poor
people and minorities [can] increase their influence over the institutions and forces that shape their lives.”60 Individualized
56. See Justin R. Corbett, Raymond Shonholtz: Community Mediation Visionary, NAFCM (Jan. 9, 2012), http://blog.nafcm.org/2012/01/raymond
-shonholtz-community-mediation.html [https://perma.cc/HZ4A-XCKJ].
57. Larry Ray, The Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 8 PEACE &
CHANGE 117, 124 (1982); Paul Wahrhaftig, An Overview of CommunityOriented Citizen Dispute Resolution Programs in the United States, in 1 THE
POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 75, 89–92 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982). Howard Zehr, a founder of the American restorative justice movement, see infra Part II.C, likewise complimented the Community
Boards for “implementing a problem-solving, community-oriented vision of justice.” ZEHR, supra note 11, at 216.
58. Raymond Shonholtz, Justice from Another Perspective: The Ideology
and Developmental History of the Community Boards Program, in THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 201, 205–08 (Sally Engle Merry & Neal Milner eds., 1995); Raymond Shonholtz, Neighborhood Justice Systems: Work, Structure, and Guiding
Principles, 5 MEDIATION Q. 3, 15–17, 26–28 (1984) [hereinafter Shonholtz,
Neighborhood Justice Systems].
59. JENNIFER E. BEER, FRIENDS SUBURBAN PROJECT, PEACEMAKING IN
YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD: REFLECTIONS ON AN EXPERIMENT IN COMMUNITY MEDIATION 218 (1986).
60. PAUL WAHRHAFTIG, COMMUNITY DISPUTE RESOLUTION, EMPOWERMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE ORIGINS, HISTORY AND FUTURE OF A MOVEMENT 63 (2004).
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complaints, he argued, often reflect community problems and require collective action to solve them.61 Richard Hofrichter, a critical scholar, likewise conjured transformations from below:
through mediation, he suggested, disputants could question the
formal legal system in ways that inspire “extralegal methods of
protest and organization of the community around collective interests.”62 In sum, mediation once embodied radical structural
ambitions.
Scholars trace the origins of restorative justice to these
community-based experiments because many tried not to distinguish between civil and criminal conflict. Here, criminal mediation developed without a singular overarching theory. Some proponents, like Shonholtz, encouraged communities to recover
crime control against government intervention: “the greater the
reliance on police and agency coercion and fear mechanisms, the
more likely it is that neighborhoods will suffer a decrease in social responsibility (that is, neighborhood atrophy) and an increase in the levels of fear and insecurity (that is, unacceptable
behavior).”63 Indeed, the most radical “hoped that mediation
would provide a genuine alternative to the criminal justice system.”64 Other proponents reasoned more modestly that “relational” conflict—be it civil or criminal—was more satisfactorily,
fairly, and efficiently resolved through informal, communitybased interventions.65
An important example of this relational approach, “neighborhood justice centers” emerged in the late 1970s to mediate a
variety of civil and criminal disputes.66 Funded by the federal
government, these centers aimed (among other ends) to “contribute to the reduction of tension and conflict in . . . communities.”67
61. Id. at 26; see also Wahrhaftig, supra note 57, at 93–94.
62. Richard Hofrichter, Neighborhood Justice and the Social Control Problems of American Capitalism: A Perspective, in 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL
JUSTICE, supra note 57, at 207, 243.
63. Shonholtz, Neighborhood Justice Systems, supra note 58, at 16.
64. BEER, supra note 59, at 203.
65. See Ray, supra note 57, at 117.
66. NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE
CENTERS FIELD TEST: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: FINAL EVALUATION REPORT
(1980); cf. Wahrhaftig, supra note 57, at 88 (questioning whether an early prominent DOJ-funded experimental neighborhood justice center was, in fact, “grassroots” as it was often publicized).
67. NAT’L INST. OF JUST., supra note 66, at 1.
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They mediated criminal disputes that typically involved assault
and harassment charges among neighbors, family members, and
intimate partners.68 By 1982, there were roughly 180 community
mediation centers in the United States that heard civil and criminal cases operating on similar models.69 Larry Ray illustrates
common cases: “A hot iron flew across the room, barely missing
the boyfriend. Enraged, he grabbed the ironing board and chased
the woman around the house,” or “yelling at the neighborhood
children, the elderly man poised a shotgun out his front window.”70 Proponents hoped that these mediation centers could
provide a kind of “community”—standing in for “traditional institutions such as the extended family, neighborhoods,
churches”—that may have once managed these sorts of relational conflicts in lieu of the state.71
Within the community mediation movement, structural ambitions withered first. As one activist community mediator conceded, “[f]or the most part, there is little sign of broader thinking
among [mediation] users. . . . Mediation is a solution to personal
discomfort and invasions of private space. The object is to be left
alone, not to begin organizing.”72 Even more, by the 1980s, the
left structural case for mediation had generated trenchant left
critique. Scholars criticized the San Francisco Community
Boards for adopting a depoliticized style oriented around training and service delivery—paradoxically empowering mediators
at the expense of the parties through professional relations of
68. Id. at 9.
69. See Ray, supra note 57, at 122; see also LARRY RAY, ABA SPECIAL
COMM. ON ALT. DISPUTE RESOLUTION, DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM DIRECTORY (1983). For other early descriptions of community mediation that spanned
civil and criminal conflict, see generally DANIEL MCGILLIS & JOAN MULLEN,
NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS: AN ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL MODELS 89–
163 (1977); Albie M. Davis, Community Mediation in Massachusetts: Lessons
from a Decade of Development, 69 JUDICATURE 307 (1986); and Robert C. Davis,
Mediation: The Brooklyn Experiment, in NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: ASSESSMENT
OF AN EMERGING IDEA 154 (Roman Tomasic & Malcolm M. Feeley eds., 1982)
(describing a particularly significant early criminal program that commonly mediated felony assault and burglary arrests).
70. Ray, supra note 57, at 117.
71. Id. at 118; see also Shonholtz, Neighborhood Justice Systems, supra
note 58, at 11.
72. BEER, supra note 59, at 220. Disputants, she observed, “are distinctly
uninterested in the links between their problems and other people’s except to
validate the truth of their own claims. Those who do see the connection usually
find it one more reason for hopelessness.” Id.

908

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:889

management and control.73 Nor, they argued, were disputants
discovering bases of social solidarity such as working-class backgrounds or common experiences of subordination.74 More generally, left socio-legal scholars levied the following indictments:
that mediation relies on techniques of individual dispute resolution to manage structural contradictions including by disciplining confrontational politics through “harmony ideology”;75 that
in modern centralized states there is no such coherent social
thing called “community,” and if it exists anywhere, it’s probably
full of hierarchy, inequality, and coercion;76 and that informal
processes invariably reconstitute professional state control and,
worse, extend that control to manage marginalized populations
(often through an illusion of voluntarism).77 In sum, a growing
left socio-legal consensus argued that community mediation was
unlikely to achieve anything approximating real community control over conflict resolution and democratic participation.
73. See, e.g., Barbara Yngvesson, Local People, Local Problems, and Neighborhood Justice: The Discourse of “Community” in San Francisco Community
Boards, in THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 58 at 379, 381–
82, 397–99.
74. Id.; see Laura Nader, When Is Popular Justice Popular?, in THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 58, at 435, 436–40; Judy H. Rothschild,
Dispute Transformation, the Influence of a Communication Paradigm of Disputing, and the San Francisco Community Boards Program, in THE POSSIBILITY
OF POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 58 at 265, 286–91; Douglas R. Thomson &
Frederic L. DuBow, Organizing for Community Mediation: The Legacy of Community Boards of San Francisco as a Social-Movement Organization, in THE
POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 58 at 169, 171, 179–96.
75. Laura Nader, The ADR Explosion - The Implications of Rhetoric in Legal Reform, 8 THE WINDSOR Y.B. OF ACCESS TO JUST. 269, 269 (1988); see also
Richard L. Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in 1 THE POLITICS OF
INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 57, at 267, 280–95.
76. See, e.g., Sally Engle Merry, Defining “Success” in the Neighborhood
Justice Movement, in NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE, supra note 69, at 172, 173–79;
Sally Engle Merry, The Social Organization of Mediation in Nonindustrial Societies, in 2 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: COMPARATIVE STUDIES 17, 28–
33 (Richard L. Abel. ed., 1982). See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE
WITHOUT LAW? 115–37 (1983) (describing how different traditions and understandings of “community” are operationalized in informal justice institutions).
77. See, e.g., CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY
AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT (1985); RICHARD
HOFRICHTER, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY: THE EXPANSION OF THE INFORMAL STATE (1987); Abel, supra note 75, at 270–80; Hofrichter,
supra note 62, at 237–40. For early catalogues of these and other criticisms, see
STANLEY COHEN, AGAINST CRIMINOLOGY 217–19 (1988) and Maureen Cain, Beyond Informal Justice, 9 CONTEMP. CRISES 335, 336–40 (1985).
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Over time, relational ambitions became less salient as well.
In the 1980s and 1990s, a different set of institutional advocates
and academic interlocutors untethered civil mediation from
early grassroots experiments, describing instead how it could rationalize judicial systems by minimizing transaction costs and
maximizing individual interests.78 In 1980, Congress passed the
Dispute Resolution Act to encourage “expeditious, inexpensive,
equitable, and voluntary resolution of disputes.”79 In 1990, Congress enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act to improve judicial
efficiency and economy, through various processes including mediation.80 That same year, Congress also encouraged administrative agencies to use ADR to yield “decisions that are faster, less
expensive, and less contentious.”81 Responding to such developments, Carrie Menkel-Meadow declared that the legal establishment’s use of ADR to “reduce caseloads and increase court efficiency” had crowded out competing visions and values.82 About
a decade later, Judith Resnik argued that American courts had
transformed themselves in response to ADR. Judges have become “suspicious of adjudication,” she observed, and prefer ADR
processes that are “committed to the utility of contract and
look[] to the participants to validate outcomes through consensual agreements.”83
This is civil mediation understood as market neoliberalism—the state devolving responsibility for dispute resolution
and translating it into practices such as efficiency and interest
maximization. Readers know the critique: it is 1984 vintage
Owen Fiss. Fiss defended adjudication, which he described as a
78. For a review, see Silbey & Sarat, supra note 55, at 446–50, 479–84 (describing the role of “the establishment bar and legal elites” in shaping ADR,
particularly as a technology that promotes interests over rights).
79. Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 96-190, § 2(a)(6), 94 Stat. 17, 17
(1980).
80. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. I, § 102, 104
Stat. 5089, 5089 (1990).
81. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 2(3), 104
Stat. 2736, 2736 (1990). For a review of this legislation and the transformation
of ADR, see also OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND RITUAL: DISPUTING SYSTEMS IN CROSS-CULTURAL CONTEXT 99–100 (2005).
82. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture:
A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or “The Law of ADR,” 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3
(1991).
83. Judith Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and
the Death of Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173, 176 (2003).
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public social process, against mediation, which he assailed as reproducing freedom-of-contract ideology.84 Tellingly, when scholars responded to Fiss by arguing that mediation also embodies
moral-relational values—for example, community cohesion,
healing, and a relational understanding of justice as something
people give to one another rather than receive from the state85—
Fiss replied that this account was not wrong, just “beside the
point.”86 Given the 1980s Reagan-style assault on the American
welfare state, Fiss predicted that mediation could mainstream
only as part of “the deregulation movement, one that permits
private actors with powerful economic interests to pursue selfinterest free of community norms.”87 In other words, Fiss ventured that powerful actors would either instrumentalize or refuse whatever moral-relational values mediation could possibly
encompass in order to advance their own economic self-interest.
As I have argued elsewhere, many American mediation
scholars themselves never relinquished more salutary and complex social visions, repeatedly proposing to combine efficiency
with relational principles.88 But Resnik and Fiss were clearly
correct to observe that the American civil judiciary used ADR to
expand market-managerial practices—not love, healing, and
reconciliation. Moreover, after the 1980s, few American ADR
scholars continued to theorize community-based mediation. And
without a kind of “collective private” that could stand for the normative role of the state, many also ceded to their Fissian critics
conflict they deemed to trigger the public’s interests. Such con-

84. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). For an extensive elaboration of this argument, see Amy J. Cohen, Revisiting Against Settlement: Some Reflections on Dispute Resolution and Public Values, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1143 (2009).
85. Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94
YALE L.J. 1660, 1665 (1985).
86. Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1669–70 (1985).
87. Id. at 1672 (internal quotation omitted).
88. See Amy J. Cohen, ADR and Some Thoughts on the “Social” in Contemporary Legal Thought, in SEARCHING FOR CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT 454
(Justin Desautels-Stein & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2017); Amy J. Cohen, The
Family, the Market, and ADR, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 91 [hereinafter Cohen, The
Family].
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flicts included, for example, matters of “fundamental constitutional rights”89 and “[r]acial discrimination”90 and, crucially,
they included crime. That is, many mediation scholars described
crime as a question of public social order, and therefore properly
subject to adjudicatory systems, not interpersonal harm and
therefore subject to mediation.91 As such, and as the community
mediation movement dissipated, criminal mediation developed
largely outside of the work of American legal scholars—and
largely outside of centrist American legal, penal, and political
power.
B. THE RISE OF CRIMINAL MEDIATION AS RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
It would take until the 1990s for restorative justice to solidify into its own academic and programmatic movement. Here, I
trace a second genealogy, namely that of scholars and practitioners whose arguments for alternative dialogic processes emerged
specifically from criticisms of the American penal system. Many
shared with community mediation proponents “[a] deep distrust
of state power; a profound cynicism about professional motives; . . . [and] a concern for the ‘self-determination’ and ‘empowerment’ of the poor and minority groups.”92 But criminal justice academics and activists had more distinctive targets: they
attacked ideals such as rehabilitation and individualized behavioral treatment—ideals, they argued, that legitimated prisons as
salutary institutions when, in fact, they “repress[ed] blacks, the
poor, the young and various cultural minorities.”93 Encapsulating this critique, a report published by the American Friends
Service Committee, a nonprofit Quaker organization, argued
that “getting the justice system off our backs” means empowering people to “avoid using the criminal justice system to solve

89. LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMCONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 17, 76–77,
192 (1987).
90. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses
of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 500 (1985).
91. In 1997, for example, Carrie Menkel-Meadow observed that criminal
mediation was intensely controversial among ADR professionals. See Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts
Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1907 (1997).
92. GARLAND, supra note 16, at 56.
93. Id. at 55.
PASSE:
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social problems.”94 Its authors hoped that “[a] web of available
community services, controlled by those who need and use them,
could persuade people to turn to these agencies, rather than to
the police, for assistance in social disturbances and family disputes.”95
Among criminal justice reformers and mediation proponents, restorativists coalesced around a distinctive claim: specifically, that crime represents a rupture in personal and social relationships, not an offence against an abstract state.96 In this
section, I illustrate how, within the emergent restorative justice
movement, arguments about structural transformation, moralrelational values, and market freedom continued to compete and
intertwine. Here I tell mostly an American story—even as restorative justice developed simultaneously (and often more robustly) in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom, and other countries in Europe—because I am interested in
tracing how structural, relational, and economic justifications
combine in American restorative justice theory and practice in
different ways over time.
In this section, let me begin with the economic. In 1977,
Randy Barnett, an American law professor and one of the first
scholars to use the term restorative justice, theorized it as part
of broader libertarian transformations in the economy including
deregulation.97 “Today,” Barnett explained, “there is an increasing desire to allow each individual to govern his own life as he

94. AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 170 (1971).
95. Id. at 166. On the role that the American Friends Service Committee
played in trying to establish community mediation programs as alternatives to
the criminal justice system, see BEER, supra note 59, at 203–05. See also
Wahrhaftig, supra note 57, at 75–77, 85–88, 93–95.
96. Many early theorists elaborated this claim by describing how premodern and indigenous legal systems blurred distinctions between tort and crime.
For a review of these arguments and a critical analysis of how such “origin stories” function in restorative theory and practice, see Kathleen Daly, Restorative
Justice: The Real Story, 4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 55, 61–64, 71–73 (2002).
97. Randy E. Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice, 87
ETHICS 279, 284–91 (1977). Tony Marshall suggests that the first use of restorative justice is often ascribed to Randy Barnett. Tony F. Marshall, Restorative
Justice: An Overview, in A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE READER 30 (Gerry Johnstone
ed., 2003). Others credit Albert Eglash with coining the term. See Albert Eglash,
Beyond Restitution: Creative Restitution, in RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
91, 91 (Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway eds., 1975).
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sees fit provided he does not violate the rights of others.”98
Crime, he argued, is not an offence against society; rather it is
“an offense by one individual against the rights of another. The
victim has suffered a loss. Justice consists of the culpable offender making good the loss he has caused.”99 As such, Barnett
reasoned that socially oriented state interests involved in managing crime—“deterrence, reformation, and disablement”—
should occur only as an effect of material restitution.100
Barnett thus articulated criminal dispute resolution as a set
of market practices. He proposed to monetize the relationship
between offender and victim, theorizing them both as rational
actors. As such, the offender could “self-determin[e]” his sentence: “The harder he worked, the faster he would make restitution. He would be the master of his fate and would have to face
that responsibility.”101 Likewise, the offender and victim could
“negotiate a reduced payment in return for a guilty plea”
through arbitration or facilitated conversation.102 And once guilt
was established, private companies could perform numerous
functions saving public money (for example, companies could sell
victim crime insurance, create and manage noncustodial or custodial work opportunities for unemployed offenders, and engage
in debt-collection).103
Although widely cited and anthologized by restorativists for
its bold anti-punitive vision (“What then is there to stop us from
overthrowing the paradigm of punishment and its penal system . . . ?,” Barnett asked), his specific proposals did not inspire
action.104 They were too radical for policymakers who—even as
98. Id. at 284.
99. Id. at 287–88.
100. Id. at 282–83.
101. Id. at 294.
102. Id. at 290.
103. Id. at 288–91, 298.
104. Id. at 294 (proceeding to consider and respond to potential objections).
For popular restorative justice anthologies where Barnett’s article appears, see
A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE READER, supra note 97, at 46 and 1 RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN CRIMINOLOGY 34 (Carolyn Hoyle ed., 2010). Barnett also influenced Howard Zehr. For example, in 1985, Zehr wrote, “Randy
Barnett has suggested that state-centered and punishment-centered assumptions constitute . . . a paradigm, and that this paradigm is in the process of
breaking down. We may, he suggests, be on the verge of a revolution in our
understanding of crime and justice.” Howard Zehr, Retributive Justice, Restorative Justice, NEW PERSP. ON CRIME AND JUST., no.4, Sept. 1985, at 6.
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they liberalized and commodified crime control—simultaneously
intensified state punishment. For restorativists, the problem
was different. Barnett’s vision lacked the communitarian spirit
and moral-relational commitments that they would use to knit
together an alternative anti-statist movement. “When restitution is reduced to ‘the cheque is in the mail,’” Braithwaite and
Mugford argued, “matters of deep moral concern have been reduced to mere money, to the ubiquitous question ‘how much?’”105
In the 1980s, the first American scholar-practitioners to implement restorativist ideals clearly prioritized relational values.
They created “explicitly restorative mediation practices” distinct
from “the first generation [community] mediation movement.”106
Often called Victim Offender Reconciliation Programs (VORPs),
these practices reflected Christian peacemaking perspectives—
not Barnett’s market libertarianism. Like Barnett, VORP practitioners argued that crime is “a conflict between people, a violation against a person, not an offense against the state.”107 But
they ranked restitution as an important yet secondary means of
addressing the emotional and informational needs of victims and
offenders.108 “Our first goal is reconciliation,” explained an early
VORP training manual, “we focus on the relational aspects of
crime. Attitudes, feelings, and needs of both victims and offenders must be taken very seriously. Healing is important.”109
These early reformers, many affiliated with the Mennonite
church, wished significantly to limit state incarceration (indeed,
in the early 1980s some joined incipient movements for prison
abolition).110 Some reformers expressed ambivalence about

105. Braithwaite & Mugford, supra note 31, at 155.
106. McCold, supra note 54, at 24.
107. Zehr, supra note 104, at 12.
108. PACT: INST. OF JUSTICE & MENNONITE CENT. COMM. OFFICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE VORP BOOK: A RESOURCE OF THE NATIONAL VICTIM OFFENDER RECONCILIATION RESOURCE CENTER III-7 (1984) [hereinafter THE
VORP BOOK]; Mark Umbreit, Mediation of Victim Offender Conflict, 1988 J.
DISP. RESOL. 85, 91 (“Rather than a primary emphasis upon restitution collection, many victim offender mediation and reconciliation programs first emphasize the importance of allowing enough time to address the frequent need for
information about the offense and the related feelings of both parties. Restitution is an important additional goal, but for many programs, only primarily as
a symbol of conflict resolution or ‘reconciliation.’”).
109. THE VORP BOOK, supra note 108, at II-5 (second emphasis added).
110. See, e.g., JOSHUA DUBLER & VINCENT LLOYD, BREAK EVERY YOKE: RE-
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working with the state, anticipating that restorative ideals need
the “staying power of religious conviction” and preferred to work
with offenders and victims that made their way into community
centers and church basements.111 Yet many forged partnerships
with courts determined “to accept only certain kinds of cases
which would have gone to jail otherwise.”112 Hence, early stateaffiliated VORP programs prioritized referrals for felony property offenses such as burglary, theft, and armed robbery as well
as negligent homicide and sometimes also assault.113 Mark Umbreit, a Christian theorist who would become particularly renowned for his empirical writing on restorative justice, encouraged VORP practitioners to consider whether, given prison
conditions and the possibilities of net-widening, it is “responsible . . . to offer any sentencing options—even VORP—unless it is
a genuine alternative to incarceration.”114 In arguing for decarceral policies, Umbreit stressed that “[t]he Christian church is
based on the fundamental concepts of love, forgiveness, and reconciliation.”115
Thomas Noakes-Duncan argues that such VORP activism
“marked a significant theological shift among Mennonites”—one
that placed the “state as much as the church . . . under the reign
of God’s justice”116 and inspired a generation of Mennonites that
broke with more conservative tradition attentive to how Jesus
embodied “radical political action.”117 In the 1970s, a strand of
Mennonite activists “were becoming sensitized to ‘structural

LIGION,

JUSTICE, AND THE ABOLITION OF PRISONS (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 156–75) (on file with author).
111. Duane Ruth-Heffelbower, Presentation to the 4th Annual Restorative
Justice Conference: Toward a Christian Theology of Church and Society as It
Relates to Restorative Justice (Oct. 25, 1996), http://ruth-heffelbower.us/docs/
speech.html [https://perma.cc/3PLW-WPLE].
112. THE VORP BOOK, supra note 108, at III-7.
113. Id. at III-9; MARK UMBREIT, CRIME AND RECONCILIATION: CREATIVE
OPTIONS FOR VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS 100 (1985).
114. Mark Umbreit, Introduction to THE VORP BOOK, supra note 108, at I1, I-5.
115. UMBREIT, supra note 113, at 77.
116. Thomas Noakes-Duncan, The Emergence of Restorative Justice in Ecclesial Practice, 5(2) J. MORAL THEOLOGY 1, 3 (2016).
117. LEO DRIEDGER & DONALD B. KRAYBILL, MENNONITE PEACEMAKING:
FROM QUIETISM TO ACTIVISM 149 (1994) (quoting JOHN H. YODER, THE POLITICS OF JESUS 12 (1972)); see also id. at 150–53, 153 tbl.6.1.
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sins’—patterns of social organization that perpetuated oppression” including social and economic injustice.118 In 1971, a large
Mennonite denomination adopted a statement calling on members to “confront those who because of their greed cause injustice
and oppression” and to “identify with the oppressed and participate in ministries of love and service in their behalf.”119 NoakesDuncan traces the rise of VORPs from within this peacemaking
tradition—VORPs were meant to be “an alternative prophetic
witness to the punitive criminal justice system.”120
By all accounts, Howard Zehr pioneered this vision. In 1978,
he founded the first American VORP in Elkhart, Indiana and
soon became the Director of the Mennonite Central Committee’s
U.S. Office of Criminal Justice.121 In 1985, when about thirty
more VORPs had opened,122 Zehr published a paper arguing for
restoration against punishment defined as the intentional infliction of suffering,123 or against, as Christie elaborated, punishment defined as “that suffering which the judge [finds] necessary
to apply in addition to those unintended constructive sufferings
the offender would go through in his restitutive actions vis-à-vis
the victim.”124 Zehr and his colleagues thus aimed to draw a principled distinction between actions agreed upon or imposed with
the aim of restoration and conflict resolution versus actions imposed with the aim “of causing suffering” (at least for offenders
capable of assuming responsibility and open to moral suasion).125
118. Id. at 150.
119. Id. at 150 & n.27 (referencing a 1971 statement endorsed by the General Conference of the Mennonite Church).
120. Noakes-Duncan, supra note 116, at 17.
121. See Howard Zehr, Curriculum Vita, Full Version, E. MENNONITE UNIV.,
ZEHR INST. FOR RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, https://web.archive.org/web/
20131015052157/http://emu.edu/cjp/restorative-justice/howard-zehr-cv/cv.pdf.
The first ever VORP, which was also Mennonite affiliated, opened in 1974 in
Kitchener, Ontario. For a detailed history, see Dean E. Peachy, The Kitchener
Experiment, in MEDIATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14–24 (Martin Wright &
Burt Galaway eds., 1989).
122. JOHN GEHM & MARK UMBREIT, NATIONAL VORP DIRECTORY (1985).
123. Zehr, supra note 104, at 3, 13.
124. Christie, supra note 22, at 10.
125. See WESLEY CRAGG, THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT: TOWARDS A THEORY OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 213 (1992). To be sure, actual experiences of restoration and punishment may blur as offenders assume significant compensatory burdens. For thoughtful analysis of how in restorative processes,
participants often combine multiple justice aims that include retributive censure, rehabilitative interventions, and restoration, see Daly, supra note 96, at
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Also like Christie, Zehr proposed direct negotiations between offenders and victims that would “encourage mutual aid,
a sense of mutuality, of community, of fellowship.”126 To that
end, he described offenders as active moral agents—not subjects
to be acted upon either through rehabilitation (“terribly susceptible to abuse”) or retribution (“one social injury replaced by another”).127 But instead as people who could appreciate the consequences of their actions and want to make things right.128 This
will to empower, he reasoned, would emerge through personal
encounters with victims who also need to reclaim agency in the
aftermath of crime. If victims could speak their needs and feelings—including for a statement of moral blamelessness and the
possibility of forgiveness—then offenders could relinquish defensive rationalizations and practice accountability by repairing
and vindicating the wrongs that victims experienced through extensive acts of reparations.129 Or at least that was Zehr’s vision:
transformations in offender and victim subjectivity and, through
subjectivity, relationships. Otherwise, he argued, reforms like
“victim compensation” or “alternative sanctions” would only
tinker at the edges of what may anyway be, he conceded, an impenetrable retributive state system.130
This moral-relational movement, which Zehr played a foundational role in creating, was never uniformly grounded in the
political left—its deeply rooted religious commitments defy simple political categorization or singular interpretations. As Part
III elaborates, politically conservative Christian writers contributed to early restorative theory.131
But Zehr himself explicitly and repeatedly linked interpersonal reconciliation to aspirations for social justice and structural transformations.132 Based on readings of the Old and New

59–60.
126. Zehr, supra note 104, at 13.
127. Id. at 6, app. 15.
128. Id. at 13.
129. Id. at 1–3.
130. Id. at 3–4, 6; see also ZEHR, supra note 11, at 226.
131. See infra Part III.B.
132. Zehr also reminded his readers to consider “the politics of paradigm
change.” Zehr, supra note 104. “Make no mistake,” he argued, “the criminal justice industry is big business, shot through with all kinds of self-interest, and
will not be changed easily.” Id. at 14.
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Testaments, Zehr described restorative justice as biblical justice—a practice of living in right spiritual, social, and material
relationships; that is, of restoring shalom.133 Restoring shalom,
he explained, requires confronting substantive injustice. Formal
adversarial systems embed substantive inequalities: “Since the
[formal] process aims to treat unequals equally, existing social
and political inequities are ignored and maintained.”134 By contrast, restoring shalom does not seek formal equality before the
law, but “to make things better.”135 In Zehr’s words:
Justice is not designed to make the status quo. Indeed, its intent is to
shake up the status quo, to improve, to move toward shalom. The move
toward shalom is not necessarily good news to everyone. In fact, it is
downright bad news to the oppressor. This too stands in contrast to
that [formally equal] justice which—by working to maintain “order”—
works in fact to maintain the present order, the status quo, even when
it is unjust.136

Zehr thus saw personal restoration working together with social
transformations.
For Zehr, social transformations become possible, even if
only in small and localized ways, because biblical law operates
not through command as much as through deliberation. In his
words: “Old Testament law does not have the sense of rigidity
and formalism that our law does. [It] points a direction, and it
must be discussed.”137 Braithwaite elaborates this dialogic ambition: “the shalom way of thinking about justice,” he explains,
means that stakeholders empowered “to repair the harm of an
injustice will produce outcomes that are more distributively satisfying to [them] than a process that seeks to deliver equal punishments to equal wrongs.”138 On this logic, restorative mediations “give little people chances to strike little blows against

133. Id. at 10–12; ZEHR, supra note 11, at 130–47.
134. ZEHR, supra note 11, at 79.
135. Id. at 140.
136. Id. Zehr writes further: “[t]he biblical approach to justice shows that
restorative justice must often be transformative justice. To make things right,
it may be necessary not merely to return to situations and people to their original condition, but to go beyond.” Id. at 190.
137. Zehr, supra note 104, at 10 (emphasis added).
138. John Braithwaite, Traditional Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, RECONCILIATION, AND PEACEBUILDING 214, 232 (Jennifer J. Llewellyn & Daniel
Philpott eds., 2014).
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oppression.”139 Zehr’s aspirations thus recall community mediation: that direct egalitarian deliberations can help reveal how
“socially structured cleavages” shape harm, conflict, and justice—inspiring greater feelings of social responsibility alongside
personal responsibility for crime.140
Zehr, Umbreit, and other early restorativists had some
small influence on state practice. In 2001, approximately 320
criminal mediation programs operated in the United States and
Canada.141 Most VORPs had become Victim Offender Mediations
(VOMs)—a secularization meant to describe court-based processes rather than the more value-laden and religious goals of
reconciliation.142 It is hard to generalize about these highly localized programs. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, for example, recounts
facilitated dialogue among victims, offenders, and family members taking place within progressive court systems, some of
which, she suggests, also looked to indigenous American justice

139. Braithwaite & Mugford, supra note 31, at 158.
140. Howard Zehr & Harry Mika, Fundamental Concepts of Restorative Justice, 1 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 47, 55 (1998). Christie likewise envisioned robust
deliberations that require lay people to debate:
When the victim is small and the offender big—in size or power—how
blameworthy then is the crime? And what about the opposite case, the
small thief and the big house-owner? If the offender is well educated,
ought he then to suffer more or maybe less, for his sins? Or if he is
black, or if he is young, or if the other party is an insurance company,
or if his wife has just left him, or if his factory will break down if he has
to go to jail . . . .
Christie, supra note 22, at 8; see also W. Richard Evarts, Compensation Through
Mediation: A Conceptual Framework, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RESTITUTION, AND
RECONCILIATION 15, 17 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1990) (“[T]he victim
must repair the harm within his power to address. This may take the form of
permitting compensation to be paid to him, reconciling himself to the injury,
forgiving the perpetrator and contributing to a better social order that will not
foster conditions under which crime arises.”).
141. Gordon Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, A Comparison of Four Restorative
Conferencing Models, JUV. JUST. BULL., Feb. 2001, at 2. In 1994, the American
Bar Association recommended that “federal, state, territorial, and local governments . . . incorporate publicly or privately operated victim-offender mediation/dialogue programs into their criminal justice processes.” AM. BAR ASS’N,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1 (1994),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/1994_am_
101b.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/RVL8-YB8S].
142. MARK UMBREIT & MARILYN P. ARMOUR, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE DIALOGUE 113–14 (2010).
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practices for inspiration.143 (Early experiments in Minnesota led
by Kay Pranis are an apt example.144) At the same time, many
early programs routinized, including by becoming part of the systemic logics they were supposed to challenge (“I am going to
VORP that kid,” prosecutors might threaten).145 And most
focused only on juveniles and minor crimes.146 As
scholar-practitioner Harry Mika recalls of this period, few restorative programs attempted to reach the core of the deeply racialized adult felony sentences that were increasingly comprising American mass incarceration.147
Despite its limited reach in practice, in the 1990s and early
2000s restorative justice inspired a good deal of criticism in

143. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Restorative Justice: What Is It and Does It
Work?, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 161, 167–68 (2007).
144. See Kay Pranis, A State Initiative Toward Restorative Justice: The Minnesota Experience, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
493, 494, 499–502 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1996); Kay Pranis, The
Minnesota Restorative Justice Initiative: A Model Experience, CRIME VICTIMS
REP., May–June 1997, reprinted in NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE SYMPOSIA SUMMARY 7 (1998), https://ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/248890.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HA5P-4SDT]. I should add that compared to countries such as
Canada and New Zealand—where the modern genealogies of restorative justice
are extensively intertwined with indigenous struggles—in the United States,
there has been less cross-fertilization and fewer efforts to translate and institutionalize indigenous justice practices into formal state systems. For an overview
of a pioneering act of institutionalization in New Zealand, see Amy J. Cohen &
Ilana Gershon, When the State Tries to See Like a Family: Cultural Pluralism
and the Family Group Conference in New Zealand, 38 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 9 (2015). In the United States, perhaps the most prominent example of indigenous borrowing followed from the Navajo Nation’s creation of the
Peacemaker Court in 1982. See Robert Yazzie & James W. Zion, Navajo Restorative Justice: The Law of Equality and Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 157, 160, 171–73. Navajo nation courts applied a theory of justice meant “to restore an offender to good standing within a
group” and generated interest on the part of both scholars and court administrators. Id. at 172; see also Howard L. Brown, The Navajo Nation’s Peacemaker
Division: An Integrated, Community-Based Dispute Resolution Forum, 24 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 297, 307–08 (1999–2000); Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes from It:”
Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV. 175, 186–87 (1994). For critical analysis, see Carole E. Goldberg, Overextended Borrowing: Tribal Peacemaking Applied in Non-Indian Disputes, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1997).
145. RUTH MORRIS, STORIES OF TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE 19 (2000).
146. Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 141, at 2.
147. Telephone conversation between Amy J. Cohen and Harry Mika (Nov.
14, 2018).
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scholarship. From outside the movement, legal scholars challenged both its economic and relational logics. From within, left
restorativists worried about losing hold of an animating structural vision.
Legal scholars first. In a widely cited 1994 article, Jennifer
Gerarda Brown pursued two lines of argument: she described
mediation as private market bargaining, which she rejected as
morally wrong to resolve public conflict. And she described how
restorative justice aims to interject moral-relational feeling into
mediation, which she rejected as the state contravening the ideals of individual liberalism.148
To briefly elaborate, Brown submitted that in mediation
parties advance their own self-interest. Hence she reasoned that
in VOMs victims will maximize restitution, offenders will maximize leniency, and prosecutors and other court officials may
maximize settlement, potentially against the desires of victims
and offenders.149 Brown did not cite Barnett for this hell of selfinterest; she simply rejected his overarching principles: “[a]llowing offenders to buy their way out of prison with monetary and
nonmonetary compensation to victims unacceptably confounds
the private goals of mediation and the public goals of criminal
law.”150 (Albert W. Alschuler had earlier warned of public outrage and even personal vengeance if citizens perceived that an
overburdened legal system was offering alternative processes “to
encourage the victim and the victimizer to resolve their differences and go on their way.”151)
In 1994, however, Brown’s central target was not Barnett
(or arguments about efficiency and system rationalization), but
rather Zehr and his colleagues and their fixation with relationships and restoration.152 Here Brown suggested that when VOM
does not collapse into a bargaining situation where everyone jostles around their own interests it’s because restorative mediators

148. See generally Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve
Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247 (1994).
149. Id. at 1268–69, 1271–72.
150. Id. at 1253.
151. Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1810 (1986).
152. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 148, at 1259–62 (on “Victim-Offender Reconciliation: The Christian Roots of VOM”).
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successfully advance fellow-feeling.153 But “[i]n the United
States,” Brown countered, “both victims and offenders can be expected to care about their individual rights and desires.”154 The
state should therefore remediate individual rights through formal procedure grounded in traditional penal theories: deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, incapacitation—ends, she implied, that already represent majoritarian public morality.155 It
should not authorize private actors to mold the moral feelings of
others according to an ethic of care.156 For this reason, feminist
critics blocked restorative justice “for cases of gendered violence
in most world jurisdictions” by arguing, like Brown, against an
ethic of relationality.157 Feminist critics worried about restorative justice’s disciplinary effects on female victims who may gift
altruism and compassion when instead they need authoritative
processes to adjudicate relationships, not heal relationships
through reparations.158

153. Id. at 1277–81.
154. Id. at 1295.
155. Id. at 1301. Brown wrote:
[T]he traditional goals of the criminal law represent the state’s rationale for exercising coercive power to punish its citizens. VOM’s inability to reconcile its effects with these traditional goals causes VOM
to expand the reach of state coercion to achieve goals the public may
not value. Meanwhile, VOM compromises the state’s ability to use its
coercive power to achieve retribution, incapacitation, and general deterrence.
Id.
156. Id. at 1273–82.
157. Sarah Curtis-Fawley & Kathleen Daly, Gendered Violence and Restorative Justice: The Views of Victim Advocates, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
603, 609 (2005).
158. In the North American context, see, for example, Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution
on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57 (1984); Kelly Rowe, The Limits of the
Neighborhood Justice Center: Why Domestic Violence Cases Should Not Be Mediated, 34 EMORY L.J. 855 (1985); Dianna R. Stallone, Decriminalization of Violence in the Home: Mediation in Wife Battering Cases, 2 LAW & INEQ. 493
(1984); and Evelyn Zellerer, Community-Based Justice and Violence Against
Women: Issues of Gender and Race, 20 INT’L J. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST.
233 (1996). See also AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 141, at 2 (“Screening [for VOM]
would also rule out mediation in most cases involving domestic violence.”).
There were, however, early exceptions. For authors advocating restorative approaches to domestic, intimate, and sexual harm, see, for example, Donna
Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo Peace-
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Brown and others were also troubled by the potential effects
of relational processes on offenders.159 They anticipated that
some offenders would accept unduly harsh and onerous “restorative” sentences arrived upon collaboratively but with few due
process protections.160 Or perhaps accept onerous sentences arrived upon not so collaboratively: Richard Delgado, for example,
conjured disciplinary mediations where a “hurt, vengeful victim”
and a “middle-class, moralistic mediator” together “participate
in a paroxysm of righteousness” against “an inarticulate, uneducated, socially alienated youth,” likely an offender of color.161
And what exactly, critical scholars continued to ask, comprises a
“community” willing and able to support offenders and victims

making, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1999); Mary P. Koss, Blame, Shame, and Community: Justice Responses to Violence Against Women, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1332
(2000); Mary P. Koss, Karen J. Bachar & C. Quince Hopkins, An Innovative
Application of Restorative Justice to the Adjudication of Selected Sexual Offenses, in CRIME PREVENTION: NEW APPROACHES 321 (Helmut Kury & Joachim
Obergfell-Fuchs eds., 2003); and Joan Pennell & Gale Burford, Feminist Praxis:
Making Family Group Conferencing Work, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE 108 (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2002). A parallel
set of feminist debates was happening within civil mediation. Beginning in the
1980s, feminist critics argued that mediation was inappropriate for divorce and
other civil family disputes when domestic violence had occurred in the underlying relationship. For a review of these debates, see Cohen, The Family, supra
note 88, at 118–19.
159. See Brown, supra note 148, at 1265, 1282–91; see also Sharon Levrant,
Francis T. Cullen, Betsy Fulton & John F. Wozniak, Reconsidering Restorative
Justice: The Corruption of Benevolence Revisited?, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 7–10
(1999).
160. See Brown, supra note 148, at 1282–91; Levrant, Cullen, Fulton & Wozniak, supra note 159. To be sure, restorativists themselves advanced arguments
for procedural safeguards, proportionality, and protection of individual rights.
See, e.g., Daniel W. Van Ness, Legal Issues of Restorative Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE HARM OF YOUTH CRIME 263 (Gordon
Bazemore & Lode Walgrave eds., 1999).
161. Richard Delgado, Goodbye to Hammurabi: Analyzing the Atavistic Appeal of Restorative Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751, 766, 768 (2000). Delgado’s critique of informalism was deeply suspicious:
The timing of VOM’s advent is also curious . . . . Juries were beginning
to contain, for the first time, substantial numbers of nonwhite members, and at least one scholar of color would soon encourage black jurors to acquit young black men, who are, in their view more useful to
the community free than behind bars. Could it be that VOM arose, consciously or not, in response to the threat of jury nullification?
Id. at 770.

924

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:889

through beneficent self-regulation?162 Numerous legal scholars
thus defended state power against moral-relational mediation
(even if sometimes reluctantly so, a posture Maureen Cain aptly
described as “defensive formalism”163).
From within the restorative justice movement the most
pressing challenges appeared different. Vexing questions centered less on concerns with the disciplinary effects of informal
relational processes than on concerns with cooptation164 and individuation.165 Harry Mika, for example, argued that personalized, relational interventions had produced an “astructural bias”
when restorative justice, like community mediation, meant to
engage victims and offenders with “the structural sources of
their collective difficulties.”166 As he put it:
[C]rime and delinquency, and all forms of conflict for that matter, are
linked to larger social issues that are often beyond the immediate control and manipulation of disputants. There are social problems in communities—unemployment, racism, violence, etc.—that give rise to conflict between individuals. How does the mediation process, or how does
the VORP, mindful of its explicit restorative, social justice goals, address these larger issues?167

Dennis Sullivan and Larry Tifft made a similar claim, arguing
that restorative justice was institutionalizing apart from attention to social and economic conditions:
162. See generally Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Danger of
“Community,” 2003 UTAH L. REV. 343.
163. Cain, supra note 77, at 339.
164. See ZEHR, supra note 11, app. 2; see also Zehr, supra note 104, at 14
(“[W]ill VORP be just another alternative program, an alternative that becomes
institutionalized, ossified, coopted until it is just another program, and perhaps
not an alternative at all?”). Restorativists especially worried that material restitution would eclipse interpersonal reconciliation. Umbreit, for example, described the “greatest danger” facing the field as “a utilitarian and exclusive focus on simply determining restitution and payment” crowding out
“opportunities for addressing the emotional issues surrounding crime and victimization, including even the possibility of forgiveness and reconciliation.”
MARC S. UMBREIT, ROBERT B. COATES & BORIS KALANJ, VICTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND MEDIATION 157–58 (1994).
165. See Harry Mika, Mediation Interventions and Restorative Justice: Responding to the Astructural Bias, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ON TRIAL: PITFALLS
AND POTENTIALS OF VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION 559 (Heinz Messmer &
Hans-Uwe Otto eds., 1992).
166. Id. at 559, 566.
167. Harry Mika, The Practice and Prospect of Victim-Offender Programs,
46 SMU L. REV. 2191, 2202 (1993) (emphasis added).
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[A]s we look over the landscape of existing programs of restorative justice, we continue to see a lack of concern over the structural conditions,
the political-economic foundations that determine whether the personal integration and reintegration of a person into his or her community will be possible. . . . How can a person find support to heal amid
social arrangements that have little or no ability to meet personal
needs, indeed, that are structured to deny the meeting of essential
needs?168

Some early left restorativists thus began to ask if restorative
practice was too individuated, too personalized, too private,169
and too disconnected from structural and redistributive concerns
with economic and social inequality.170 Others predicted that restorativists would “ultimately stand with libertarians on many
issues, because they question the value of much government intervention.”171 Hence, we might ask, were restorativists summoning themselves into broader “policies of deregulation and
market freedom” that scholars argue were transforming American criminal justice administration?172
C. AMERICAN PENAL TRANSFORMATIONS
Here I must pull back: the theory and practice of restorative
justice described above, affiliated with scholars such as Zehr and
Umbreit, emerged against the background of broad social and

168. DENNIS SULLIVAN & LARRY TIFFT, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: HEALING
THE FOUNDATIONS OF OUR EVERYDAY LIVES ix (2001) (emphasis added).
169. See, e.g., GERRY JOHNSTONE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: IDEAS, VALUES,
DEBATES 124 (2d ed. 2002) (“[M]any who were sympathetic towards the ideas of
restorative justice . . . nevertheless criticized . . . victim-offender mediation for
being too ‘private’ and for failing to involve the community . . . .”).
170. See, e.g., Dennis Sullivan & Larry Tifft, The Transformative and Economic Dimensions of Restorative Justice, 22 HUMAN. & SOC’Y 38, 43 (1998) (arguing that insufficient “attention is paid to social structural violence, that is,
violence done to people through the exercise of power, and hierarchical social
arrangements that support the maintenance of this power”); see also David
Dyck, Reaching Toward a Structurally Responsive Training and Practice of Restorative Justice, 3 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 239, 239 (2000) (cataloguing (largely
North American) critiques of restorative justice for focusing “too much on the
interpersonal dimensions of crime while largely ignoring the deeper roots of the
trouble as found in class, race/ethnicity, and gender-based conflict”).
171. Gordon Bazemore & Mara Schiff, Understanding Restorative Community Justice: What and Why Now?, in RESTORATIVE COMMUNITY JUSTICE: REPAIRING HARM AND TRANSFORMING COMMUNITIES 36 (Gordon Bazemore &
Mara Schiff eds., 2001).
172. GARLAND, supra note 16, at 99–102.
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political changes in the American penal system that make a political question about the relationship between restorative justice and “policies of deregulation and market freedom” in the
1990s intelligible but also, as a practical-institutional matter,
then not terribly pressing. The question is intelligible because
restorative justice shares core ideas in common with what David
Garland describes as three key changes in the American penal
system that meshed with a broader retreat from public welfarist
interventions—namely, an attack on rehabilitation; governing
through community; and the rise of the victim (all described below).173 But before the millennium the question was not terribly
pressing because leading restorative justice proponents interpreted each commitment in ways that made their own work marginal—that is, without the kind of mainstream institutional legibility likely to inspire assimilation. As long as the American
penal state advanced a law-and-order agenda—based simultaneously on punishment and rational economics—restorative justice remained a fringe movement without any real left or right
political power.
To briefly elaborate, Garland submits that from the 1970s
onward, penal welfarism—a set of penal ideas and practices
based on correctional concerns and professional rehabilitation—
lost its status as “the overarching ideology of the system.”174 Penal welfarism reflected a modern statist ideal: that “social problems are best managed by specialist bureaucracies that are
directed by the state, informed by experts, and rationally
directed towards particular tasks.”175 In the 1970s, prominent
retributivists such as Andrew von Hirsh led an attack on social
purpose, proposing that criminal courts instead enact only proportional, uniform, equitable, desert-based sentences disconnected from concerns with offender “treatment.”176
As we have seen, restorativists joined an attack on
penal welfarism. Indeed, restorativists shared elements of
retributivist theory, specifically how it configures offenders as
responsible moral agents, rather than as deviant subjects in
173. For elaborations of these three (and other) transformations in American
criminal justice administration, see id. at 8–20, 123–27.
174. Id. at 8.
175. Id. at 34.
176. See generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF
PUNISHMENTS (1976).
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need of therapeutic interventions. But they rejected a model of
deserved punishment not only because many shunned punitive
intent, but also because they found desert theory too general and
impersonal. As Kathleen Daly explains, “von Hirsch wants to
limit the [desert-based] ‘censure conveyed through punishment . . . [to the] person externally,’” and not entitle the state “to
use its coercive powers to seek to induce moral sentiments of repentance.”177 Many restorativists argued exactly the opposite.
They wanted criminal procedures to trigger personalized penitential feelings.
In the United States, neither measured retributivists advocating for equitable, proportional punishments, nor restorativists advocating for personalized, dialogic forms of accountability
succeeded in practice. Policy elites instead translated retributivist theory into “harsh justice”178 based on an image of an irredeemable criminal actor (“the threatening outcast, the fearsome
stranger”) and encoded it in rules such as mandatory minimums,
three strike laws, and the elimination of parole.179 But rules amplifying punishment did not exhaust the logics of criminal justice
during this period. To the contrary, at the same time as the
“state’s power to punish [took] on a renewed political salience
and priority,” the state’s capacity to engage in crime control also
came “to be viewed as limited and contingent.”180 Here the criminal justice state, like many aspects of the American administrative and adjudicatory state, increasingly relied on extra-state
private controls.
Hence, Americans also witnessed the rise of community as
a solution to many criminal justice problems (think: community
policing, community corrections, community crime controls).181
In this paradigm, “community” often became a receptacle for rational choice criminology now operating “beyond the state.”182
Theorists and policymakers described criminals as “opportunistic consumer[s]”183 who break laws when benefits outweigh
177. Kathleen Daly, Revisiting the Relationship Between Retributive and Restorative Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: PHILOSOPHY TO PRACTICE 33, 46–
47 (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2000).
178. WHITMAN, supra note 17.
179. GARLAND, supra note 16, at 137.
180. Id. at 120.
181. See id. at 123.
182. Id. at 129.
183. Id.
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costs,184 and therefore they designed community controls to decentralize and optimize risk management through, for example,
private surveillance, local patrols, and incentives to reward lawabiding behavior.
Restorative justice shared a community-oriented ethos. For
example, Bazemore and Umbreit reasoned that the ultimate success of restorative justice should be measured by “its ability to
strengthen the capacity of communities to respond effectively to
crime.”185 But restorativists did not argue for community controls based on risk-management and rewards. Rather, they
wished to narrow the social distance between offenders and victims by re-embedding them in social relations. They hoped that
in restorative mediations educators, clergy, extended family, and
neighbors could collectively instill within offenders pro-social behavior through feelings of empathy and remorse for the harms
they committed against their particular victims.186
To that end, restorativists also joined a larger social movement in the 1980s and 1990s to prioritize the voices of victims.
Much of this movement was driven, Markus Dirk Dubber argues, “by grassroots campaigns of concerned citizens backed by
politicians eager to outdo their opponents in the tough-on-crime
competition.”187 These activists and politicians often encouraged
citizens to identify intensely with victims through individualized
184. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
185. Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 141, at 15.
186. See, e.g., Anthony Bottoms, Some Sociological Reflections on Restorative
Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS? 79, 100 (Andrew von Hirsch, Julian Roberts, Anthony
E. Bottoms, Kent Roach & Mara Schiff eds., 2003) (“RJ has remained predominantly small-scale and communitarian . . . [with] certainly very little use of such
late modern devices as risk assessment profiles. Neither RJ practitioners, nor
most academics sympathetic to RJ, show any sustained interest in the issues of
‘managerialism’ and ‘risk’ in relation to criminal justice . . . .”); Richard Young,
Testing the Limits of Restorative Justice: The Case of Corporate Victims, in NEW
VISIONS OF CRIME VICTIMS 133, 162–65 (Carolyn Hoyle & Richard Young eds.,
2002) (describing how restorative mediations require corporate representatives
that are willing to express concerns with personal safety, security and loss, and
to engage in “inclusionary” dialogue with offenders, rather than to use conferences to engage in actuarial risk-management strategies); Braithwaite & Mugford, supra note 31, at 144 (describing how offenders can learn to feel shame
and remorse through connections with others).
187. Markus Dirk Dubber, The Victim in American Penal Law: A Systematic
Overview, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 6 (1999).
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and spectacular representations of their suffering.188 The victims’ rights movement also coincided with a decline in social solidarity expressed by faith in public institutions. As Garland observes, “in the new morality of market individualism, . . . moral
sentiments are increasingly privatized along with everything
else.”189 As such, he reasons, individual narratives of victim suffering became especially useful to motivate moral feeling.190 Jonathan Simon offers a related claim. He traces how late twentieth
century policy elites used the “victim” to replace the “worker” or
“consumer” as the idealized American citizen in need of state
protection.191 Both Garland and Simon thus read the rise of the
(often white, middle-class) figure of the victim onto broader
political transformations. In the economic sphere, this victim
helped to justify the state’s retreat from welfarist interventions
on behalf of workers and consumers; in the penal sphere,
it helped to justify the state’s intensification of moral
law-and-order statism and market-managerial crime control—
three trends that scholars read together as neoliberal criminal
justice administration.192
How should we understand restorative justice here? Restorativists argue, after all, that crime primarily harms a victim
(and, yes, her community as well) but not an abstract “society”
or the state.193 And as the field advanced, restorativists worked
intently to make their practice more victim-centered against
criticisms that their real allegiances lay with offenders.194 Yet
188. See id. at 9; Aya Gruber, Duncan Kennedy’s Third Globalization, Criminal Law, and the Spectacle, 3 COMP. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2012).
189. GARLAND, supra note 16, at 200.
190. Id.
191. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON
CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF
FEAR 75, 77 (2007).
192. See also BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS:
PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER (2011); Aya Gruber, Rape,
Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 618–25 (2009).
193. Christie, for example, called for “a victim-oriented” court. Christie, supra note 22, at 10. Or as Zehr put it, “[t]he theory and practice of restorative
justice have emerged from and been profoundly shaped by an effort to take [the]
needs of victims seriously.” HOWARD ZEHR, THE LITTLE BOOK OF RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE 15 (2002).
194. See, e.g., Harry Mika, Mary Achilles, Ellen Halbert, Lorraine Stuzman
Amstutz & Howard Zehr, Listening to Victims: A Critique of Restorative Justice
Policy and Practice in the United States, 68 FED. PROB. 32 (2004). Indeed, scholars began to argue that sharpening an “essential focus on victim needs . . . is
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restorativists persisted in refusing an idealized image of a vengeful victim mobilized by policy elites. In the restorativist imagination, if a victim is rendered insecure or even shattered, with
support and the refuge of community, she is able to express anguish and anger and yet transcend vengeance, becoming open to
personal recovery and forgiveness. For Zehr, this victim reflects
what it means to be Christian: “seeking suffering for offenders is
neither productive nor consistent with God’s love”195 (a point he
would later rewrite using trauma theory196).
At this point, two observations should be clear. First, we can
see how restorative justice, as it coalesced in the 1990s, was congruous with many of the broader neoliberal penal trends that
coexisted with its creation: crime is personalized, justice is privatized, offenders are responsibilized, victims are centralized,
the community is mobilized, and the state is deemphasized.
These ideals are all rich for complex political alliances and new
translations. Yet, we can also see why the restorative movement
had little institutional pull in the decades preceding the millennium. Restorativists insisted on a moral-dialogic offender while
the criminal justice system envisaged a rational or pathological
offender; restorativists insisted on a relational victim whereas
policy elites repeatedly conjured a vengeful one; and
restorativists invoked an inclusionary (if also vague) understanding of community as an entity desirous and capable of “increas[ing] individual . . . commitment to the common good”
whereas mainstream criminal justice reformers theorized community according to rational economic logics.197 Hence, for
scholar-practitioners who hoped that restorative justice could
advance social and distributive justice—yet worried that restorative practice had become too individuated and “a-structural”—
it would not have made sense to engage in too much handessential to [restorative justice’s] survival.” Gordon Bazemore & Sandra
O’Brien, The Quest for a Restorative Model of Rehabilitation: Theory-for-Practice and Practice-for-Theory, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND THE LAW, supra note
34, at 31, 35.
195. HOWARD ZEHR, WHO IS MY NEIGHBOR? LEARNING TO CARE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME 9 (1984).
196. Howard Zehr, Restoring Justice, in GOD AND THE VICTIM: THEOLOGICAL
REFLECTIONS ON EVIL, VICTIMIZATION, JUSTICE, AND FORGIVENESS 131, 139–
46 (Lisa Barnes Lampman & Michelle D. Shattuck eds., 1999) (drawing on JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE—FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL TERROR (1992)).
197. Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 141, at 15.
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wringing. To be sure, restorative justice failed, as its left proponents reflected, to generate structural change or any significant
measure of decarceration (it would have taken a revolution to do
otherwise). But in the law-and-order climate of the 1990s in the
United States, restorative justice was far too marginal—perhaps
far too ethereal—for anyone to seriously claim it was strengthening neoliberalism.
III. RETRIBUTIVE-RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND MORAL
NEOLIBERALISM: 2000s TO NOW
After the crisis of mass incarceration, I think the situation
has changed. As Americans have come to question elements of
penal harshness alongside the costs of mass imprisonment (and
as crime rates have declined),198 policymakers have begun to
pursue small programs of decarceration.199 Reformers on the political right, however, do not appeal simply to rational economic
calculations to justify penal reform even as they advocate conservative fiscal policy and small government. Some also actively
encourage restoration—albeit often as a supplement to, rather
than a replacement for, retribution. In this Part, I trace ideas
that contributed to this transformation. First, in the early 2000s
among American criminal law professors who advocated for the
integration of restorative justice and traditional penal theories
and, in so doing, urged greater attention to the relational, not
simply micro-economic, determinants of individual behavior and
crime. Second, among evangelical Christian reformers whose vision of restorative justice includes the claim that theories of
crime and reconciliation should be de-structuralized.
I suggest that a working composite of these ideas is today
supported by the Charles Koch Foundation, a nonprofit within
the broader Koch network committed to advancing individual
liberty and economic freedom and opposed to redistributive pub-

198. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE (2007).

199. Jonathan Simon, for example, suggests that a new “consensus now exists among criminologists that states should be addressing many nonviolent,
nonserious crimes—even many now classed as felonies—with some combination
of fines (which can be made income neutral), restorative justice, enhanced probation . . . and very short terms in local jails.” SIMON, supra note 8, at 159. He
also notes that “2010 was the first year in the last thirty-seven in which the
nationwide prison population decreased.” Id. at 173 n.1.

932

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:889

lic social policies. The Foundation applies “market-based management” (a registered trademark) to solve social problems, and
now encourages penal reform as part of advancing its overarching mission.200
To illustrate the radicalism of this vision, consider that
Charles Koch once criticized Chicago school economist Milton
Friedman for “merely trying to make government work more efficiently when the true libertarian should be tearing it out at the
root.”201 Here my overarching argument is as follows: radical libertarians and proponents of market freedom today support restorative ideas in part because they know that a compelling case
for shrinking the penal and social state cannot rest solely on economic discipline. As such, restorative justice illustrates how
moral-relational values are not invariably criticisms of—they
can already be incorporated from within—neoliberalism.
A. MORAL MEDIATION
In 2003, Erik Luna (who would later establish a Kochsupported criminal justice center) hosted what he ventured was
the first gathering devoted to restorative justice in “American
legal academe.”202 Luna asked if restorative justice could be
“more cost effective, more likely to reduce crime rates and recidivism, and more humane” than standard criminal justice practice.203 But rather than promote the thick value-laden version
associated with Zehr and his colleagues, Luna proposed a “procedural conception of restorative justice [that] would allow all

200. See, e.g., Market Based Management, CHARLES KOCH FOUND.,
https://www.charleskochfoundation.org/about-us/market-based-management/
[https://perma.cc/3WQ2-4CAF]; Criminal Justice Reform Grants, CHARLES
KOCH FOUND., https://www.charleskochfoundation.org/apply-for-grants/
requests-for-proposals/criminal-justice-policing-reform/ [https://perma.cc/72BS
-TMME].
201. BRIAN DOHERTY, RADICALS FOR CAPITALISM: A FREEWHEELING HISTORY OF THE MODERN AMERICAN LIBERTARIAN MOVEMENT 443 (2007). For
Koch’s remarks, see Reminiscences & Prognostications: 10 Key Libertarian Activists Discuss the Significance of the Movement They Helped Build, REASON
(May 1978), https://reason.com/1978/05/01/reminiscences-prognostications
[https://perma.cc/8J6U-D62S].
202. Erik Luna, Introduction: The Utah Restorative Justice Conference, 2003
UTAH L. REV. 1, 14.
203. Id. at 3.
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modern punishment theories to contribute to the decisionmaking process.”204 He envisioned respectful dialogues that would
include moral censure of the criminal act and where participants
could collaboratively reach any agreement on sanctioning for any
reason, provided it doesn’t contravene what Luna argued should
be legislatively mandated floors and ceilings.205 Luna thus aimed
to interject purposeful indeterminacy into the restorative model;
from his perspective, restorative practices like reparations and
forgiveness could overlap with any modern penal value.206
In the same volume, Paul Robinson likewise proposed separating restorative justice processes from restorative justice theory. Contra Brown and Delgado, Robinson liked how restorative
processes infuse the criminal justice system with moralrelational influence and bottom-up participation—values he reasoned that could produce “significant crime control benefits”
through system-wide legitimation.207 But Robinson argued that
beyond minor cases, restorative meditations should complement,
not replace, deserved punishment for the sake of what he called
“justice.”208 Darren Bush proposed a different marriage: he commended restorative interventions for shaping moral-relational
preferences yet thought “restorative justice ought to be combined
with some [non-restorative] mechanisms that have deterrence
value.”209
These integrative theories—articulated by prominent criminal law scholars who may hold a range of political positions on
204. Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception
of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 288 (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 289–95.
206. Cf. John Braithwaite, Holism, Justice, and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L.
REV. 389, 391 & n.14 (“I cannot see how one can nurture restorative values like
mercy and forgiveness while taking retributive proportionality seriously . . . .
This is not to deny that there is a retributive conception of mercy and that there
could be a retributive theory of forgiveness. It is just to say that mercy and forgiveness as restorative values mean something very different from what they
could mean under any retributive formulation.”).
207. Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of Restorative Processes, the Vices of “Restorative Justice,” 2003 UTAH L. REV. 375, 376; cf. Tom R. Tyler, Restorative Justice and Procedural Justice: Dealing with Rule Breaking, 62 J. SOC. ISSUES 307
(2006).
208. Robinson, supra note 207, at 384.
209. Darren Bush, Law and Economics of Restorative Justice: Why Restorative Justice Cannot and Should Not Be Solely About Restoration, 2003 UTAH L.
REV. 439, 469.
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the relationship between the market and the state, I don’t presume to speculate—accomplished two things. First, they removed normative barriers to theorizing restorative justice as
consistent with existing punishment ideologies rather than as
an aspirational alternative to the dominant carceral paradigm,
opening up new conceptual spaces for restorative justice to
travel. Second, they retained for restorative justice a specific
moral distinctiveness by promoting moral-relational values such
as apology, remorse, and forgiveness—values that compel ethical action because they are theorized apart from rational economics and market discipline.
Consider, as one final example, a 2004 Yale Law Journal
article by Stephanos Bibas (who is now a federal judge appointed
by President Trump) and Richard Bierschbach. They criticized
“[m]ainstream criminal law scholarship” for over-emphasizing
“microeconomic concerns with individual behavior” while neglecting “the social and relational dimensions of criminal wrongdoing.”210 “Lawyers, schooled in law and economics,” they argued, “are taught to evaluate settlements from a rational-actor
perspective. We add up the monetary benefits, subtract the monetary costs, and arrive at a net present value . . . . But the ordinary person does not evaluate crime and punishment that
way.”211
Bibas and Bierschbach thus called for moral dialogic processes—specifically victim-offender mediation—to promote
“moral education, catharsis, healing, and reconciliation.”212
Through VOM, they reasoned, offenders could “realize the
wrongfulness of their acts, feel sorrow for their misdeeds, and
accept responsibility. . . . [R]emorse and apology can help offenders cleanse their consciences and return to the moral fold.”213
Likewise, victims could potentially “achieve catharsis, let go of
their anger, and forgive.”214 Yet they argued that “[r]emorse and
apology are not substitutes for punishment in most cases, as the
restorative justice movement mistakenly contends.”215 “For most
210. Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and
Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 111, 112, 148 (2004).
211. Id. at 147.
212. Id. at 148.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 91 (emphasis added).
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crimes of more than minimal seriousness,” they insisted, “punishment is needed to underscore the community’s denunciation
of the crime and vindication of the victim.”216 Hence Bibas and
Bierschbach criticized “the academic literature” for failing to notice an “intriguing fusion of mediation and punishment”217—proposing to transform what was once many restorativists’ fear or
at least a very “fraught issue”218 into a normative policy agenda.
B. MORAL NEOLIBERALISM AND AMERICAN RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE
Writing from a different perspective, evangelical prison reformer Charles Colson advanced his own retributive-restorative
fusion (that Bibas and Bierschbach could have invoked to challenge the dominant understanding of restorative justice penned
by Zehr and Braithwaite that rejects or minimizes retribution).
A former Nixon administration official, in 1975 Colson founded
Prison Fellowship, a large international prison ministry,
after experiencing a spiritual transformation while serving a
prison sentence for Watergate-related offenses.219 Like other
restorativists (and, in the 1970s, writing before the restorative
justice movement coalesced), Colson attempted to humanize offenders. He described the people he met in prison not as rational
calculators but rather as men with “a sense of decency and goodness” yet “in the grip of some kind of evil power,”220 and he simultaneously described all of us as fellow sinners (“we all share
with [prisoners] a common heritage of sin”).221

216. Id. at 123 n.183.
217. Id. at 124.
218. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 11, at 16.
219. See generally CHARLES W. COLSON, BORN AGAIN (1976). On Prison Fellowship, see PRISON FELLOWSHIP, ANNUAL REPORT (2017), http://
prisonfellowship.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/AnnualReport_17_Nov21_
web.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2BV-BPXA]. In 2017, its revenues were over 39 million. Id.
220. COLSON, supra note 219, at 319. For a broader genealogy of some of the
strands of American Christianity reflected in Colson’s penal ideas, see David A.
Green, Penal Optimism and Second Chances: The Legacies of American Protestantism and the Prospects for Penal Reform, 15 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 123
(2013).
221. Charles Colson, Towards an Understanding of Imprisonment and Rehabilitation, in CRIME AND THE RESPONSIBLE COMMUNITY 151, 165–66 (John
Stott & Nick Miller eds., 1980).
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In the late 1980s, an arm of Prison Fellowship called Justice
Fellowship began to develop its own explicit theory and practice
of restorative justice.222 “It should be noted,” the organization explained, “that the term restorative justice is not unique to Justice
Fellowship, although this formulation of the vision is.”223 Prison
Fellowship reformers based their model on ideas that Daniel
Van Ness elaborated in his 1986 book Crime and Its Victims224
and that Van Ness rearticulated along with Colson in their 1989
book Convicted.225
Around the millennium this work intensified and began to
institutionalize. In 1997, at the behest of then-Governor of Texas
George W. Bush, another arm of Prison Fellowship implemented
the first contemporary faith-based program in an American
prison in Texas, which featured an intensive restorative curriculum (offenders engaged in dialogic encounters with groups of
victims).226 In the span of a few years, this Prison Fellowship affiliate opened similar programs in Kansas, Iowa, and Minnesota;227 Van Ness and Karen Heetderks Strong published Restoring Justice, a book intended for secular audiences;228 Colson and
his coauthors published law review articles advocating for restorative principles and legislation;229 Colson published Justice
that Restores;230 and another Prison Fellowship-affiliated organ-

222. DANIEL W. VAN NESS, DAVID R. CARLSON JR., THOMAS CRAWFORD &
KAREN STRONG, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: THEORY 5 (1989) (describing, for example, how in 1988 the board of Justice Fellowship began a three-year project to
design a restorative justice model based on biblical principles).
223. Id. at 5 (second emphasis added). The authors then proceeded to write:
“[f]or popularizing that name and for his many other generous contributions of
time and insights, we are deeply indebted to Howard Zehr, Director of the Mennonite Central Committee’s U.S. Office of Criminal Justice.” Id.
224. DANIEL W. VAN NESS, CRIME AND ITS VICTIMS (1986).
225. CHARLES COLSON & DANIEL VAN NESS, CONVICTED: NEW HOPE FOR
ENDING AMERICA’S CRIME CRISIS (1989).
226. Chuck Colson & Pat Nolan, Prescription for Safer Communities, 18
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 387, 394 (2004).
227. Id.
228. DANIEL VAN NESS & KAREN HEETDERKS STRONG, RESTORING JUSTICE
(1997).
229. Charles W. Colson, Truth, Justice, Peace: The Foundations of Restorative Justice, 10 REGENT U. L. REV. 1 (1998); Colson & Nolan, supra note 226;
Daniel W. Van Ness & Pat Nolan, Legislating for Restorative Justice, 10 REGENT
U. L. REV. 53 (1998).
230. CHARLES W. COLSON, JUSTICE THAT RESTORES (2001).
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ization published a volume on Christian approaches to victimization.231
Colson and his coauthors engaged with early VORP writers
such as Zehr (and vice versa) to describe and elaborate Christian
restorative principles. But Colson and Zehr offered crucially different biblical visions.232 Colson argued that restoration should
coexist normatively with retribution, that crime should be theorized apart from preexisting social-structural-environmental
conditions, and that restorativists should seek active partnerships with the state, but in order to encourage social welfare privatization. Let me flesh out these distinctions.
Retribution first. Like other early restorativists, Colson suspected treatment and deterrence-based theories of punishment:
“To justify punishment by whether it ‘deters or cures,’” Colson
wrote, “is the triumph of sociology over justice.”233 But just deserts, he submitted, reflects God’s rightful authority to punish
morally evil acts—authority, he explained, that works through
the hands of the secular magistrate.234 As such, Winnifred Sullivan summarizes, “[t]he state’s failure to exact retribution is, in
Colson’s view, the first step to ‘collapse of the entire social order.’”235
A self-described law-and-order conservative who champions
retribution, Colson nonetheless argued that restorative justice is
necessary to rebalance American democracy in favor of liberty.236

231. GOD AND THE VICTIM: THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON EVIL, VICTIMIZAJUSTICE AND FORGIVENESS (Lisa Barnes Lampman & Michelle D. Shattuck eds., 1999).
232. Some early writers noted these distinctions. For example, in 1989 the
Mennonite Central Committee Office of Criminal Justice published a volume
with contributions from Howard Zehr, Daniel Van Ness, and M. Kay Harris.
Harris criticized Van Ness (but not Zehr) for an “exclusive emphasis on the individual responsibility of the offender [that] appears likely to reinforce current
social divisions and inequities.” M. Kay Harris, Alternative Visions in the Context of Contemporary Realities, in JUSTICE: THE RESTORATIVE VISION 31–32
(1989).
233. WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, PRISON RELIGION: FAITH-BASED REFORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 104 (2009).
234. Id. at 105.
235. Id.
236. Colson, supra note 229, at 1 (“Citizens either must restrain themselves
by an internal sense of duty or they must be restrained externally by a sense of
fear. . . . ‘The greater the strength of duty, the greater the liberty.’”).
TION,
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Order, he reasoned, often costs some individual freedom.237 But
“[a] fearful public has alternatives to strong-armed intervention
by the government to suppress disorder”—namely, citizens who
volitionally turn away from personal preferences to objective
moral truth and the authority of law.238 From this perspective,
the problem with the American justice system is not just deserts
(although Prison Fellowship writers submit that some deserts
like mandatory minimums and carceral sentences for nonviolent
offenders are unjustly excessive).239 The problem is rather that
retribution lacks moralizing—indeed revelatory—force because
it is not placed “in the context of community and always with the
chance of transformation of the individual and the healing of
fractured relationships and of the moral order.”240 Like the legal
scholars described above, Colson argued that punishment and
restoration should be fused together.
Second, Colson pitted restorative justice against modernist
social theories of crime—that is, against a view that holds “fault
lies not in ourselves, but in unemployment, racism, poverty, or
mental illness” and “the solution to crime must lie in addressing
those outside factors.”241 “No matter what its aggravating
causes,” Colson and Van Ness insisted, “there is only one taproot
of crime. It is not some sociological phenomenon; it is sin.”242
“The Bible tells us that crime is sin,” Prison Fellowship’s restorative justice training manual likewise explains.243 From this perspective, faith conquers crime—that is, self and social order are
restored through spiritual transformations, ministered by Christians in direct, personal, and loving relations.

237. Id. at 1–9.
238. Id. at 9.
239. See, e.g., COLSON & VAN NESS, supra note 225, at 89 (“If we really want
to get tough on crime, let’s hold offenders accountable to their victims. Let’s
reserve prisons for hardened criminals (where they can be incarcerated for
longer periods of time), and let’s put nonviolent offenders to work.”); VAN NESS,
supra note 224, at 88 (“I am not justifying the kind of punishments we inflict
today in prison. . . . But we should not abandon the notion of punishment simply
because there are problems with its implementation.”).
240. COLSON, supra note 230, at 115.
241. COLSON & VAN NESS, supra note 225, at 56.
242. Id. at 57.
243. SULLIVAN, supra note 233, at 95.

2019]

MORAL RESTORATIVE JUSTICE

939

Arguments for social service privatization follow. Public institutions fail, Colson and Van Ness ventured, because “no governmental system can . . . change the human heart.”244 Government, they reasoned, sacralizing (a version of) libertarianism,
has necessary functions including “the God-ordained responsibility to restrain evil and to preserve public order . . . through its
police forces, courts, and prisons.”245 But the Church “brings
unique resources to offenders that government programs cannot
hope to effect,” namely, love and communion.246
The surge of faith-based restorative prison programs that
Prison Fellowship spearheaded in the late 1990s and early 2000s
reflected, as Melinda Cooper observes, “a much wider transformation of the social services that has seen religious providers
actively included in government contracts to provide homeless
shelters, soup kitchens, group homes, substance-abuse treatment, welfare-to-work training, healthy marriage, and responsible fatherhood instruction, along with a whole host of other services for the poor.”247 These transformations were, in turn, made
possible by changes in American welfare legislation. In 1996,
when the federal government scaled back means-tested welfare,
it simultaneously authorized states to contract with religious organizations to provide social services “without impairing the religious character of such organizations.”248 In 2001, President
Bush expanded opportunities for religious organizations to
“meet[] the needs of poor Americans,” including by creating the
White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives.249 Lew Daly has described these initiatives as “an effort to
hollow out the welfare state by relinquishing its public authority
to religious groups.”250 Colson himself made a similar claim.
“What’s at stake,” he stressed, discussing a legal challenge to
government funding of Prison Fellowship’s prison interventions,
“is not just a prison program, but how we deal with social prob-

244. COLSON & VAN NESS, supra note 225, at 67.
245. Id. at 71.
246. Id.
247. COOPER, supra note 37, at 265.
248. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104, 110 Stat. 2105, 2161–63 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 601–617, 619 (2012)) (“charitable choice” provision).
249. Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 §§ 1–2 (Jan. 29, 2001).
250. LEW DALY, GOD AND THE WELFARE STATE 32 (2006).
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lems in our country. Do we do it through grassroots organizations or big government? We know what works.”251
Indeed, consider how Van Ness and Pat Nolan252 described
a model secular restorative justice program. A juvenile court recruits public and private actors and clergy to help offenders surmount bad behavior: “If they were chronically absent, their truant officer was included. If they couldn’t read, local optometrists
performed free eye exams. If they needed glasses, the local Lions
Club donated them. If they were gang members, plastic surgeons
volunteered to remove their tattoos.”253 In this example, basic
forms of care—eye exams and glasses—happen voluntarily
through the community. Voluntarism matters greatly, as Prison
Fellowship Vice President Heather Rice-Minus explains, because it grounds the Christian case for small government: “As
Christians, rather than spend more money through taxes so that
the state can act as an institutional service provider, we wish to
give in ways that build relationships.”254
Daly argues that partnerships between the federal government and religious organizations have helped “the religious
groups that provide social services, not the people who depend

251. Samantha M. Shapiro, Charles Colson’s Jails for Jesus, MOTHER
JONES, Nov./Dec. 2003, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2003/11/jails
-jesus-charles-colson/ [https://perma.cc/Z3XL-FVHS]; see also Tanya Erzen, Testimonial Politics: The Christian Right’s Faith-Based Approach to Marriage and
Imprisonment, 59 AM. Q. 991 (2007). On the lawsuit Colson is invoking, see generally SULLIVAN, supra note 233.
252. Pat Nolan was a prominent California Republican who, after serving a
prison sentence for racketeering, joined the leadership of Prison Fellowship and
strongly advocated for restorative justice. See generally PAT NOLAN, WHEN PRISONERS RETURN: WHY WE SHOULD CARE AND HOW YOU AND YOUR CHURCH CAN
HELP (2004). In 2010, he cofounded the libertarian think tank, Right on Crime.
See, e.g., Pat Nolan, ACU FOUND.: CTR. FOR CRIM. JUST. REFORM, http://
acufoundation.conservative.org/center-for-criminal-justice-reform/pat-nolan/
[https://perma.cc/9JW7-VSEG]. Right on Crime also advances restorative justice. See, e.g., Derek M. Cohen, Reviving Restorative Justice: A Blueprint for
Texas, RIGHT ON CRIME (Dec. 16, 2013), http://rightoncrime.com/2013/12/
reviving-restorative-justice-a-blueprint-for-texas/ [https://perma.cc/UX2S
-XNG7].
253. Van Ness & Nolan, supra note 229, at 94.
254. Telephone Interview by Amy J. Cohen with Heather Rice-Minus, Vice
President of Gov’t Affairs, Advocacy & Pub. Policy, Prison Fellowship (May 14,
2018).
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on them.”255 But I want to read all this in good faith.256 Motivating arguments against the American welfare state and public
provisioning are lived spiritual commitments to personal redemption, mutual aid, love, and relationship-building.
As the following case illustrates, here we have a version of
restorative justice aptly expressed as moral neoliberalism. Its
decarceral potential is ethically appealing, drawing on values
such as redemption and forgiveness alongside values such as efficiency and cost savings; it is likely practically desirable for anyone concerned with the inhumanity of today’s prisons; and it is
used explicitly by libertarians and conservatives to break popular associations with government as a necessary and desirable
social institution.
C. VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION IN TEXAS
Texas, a state known for fiscally oriented libertarian penal
reform,257 is experimenting with VOM. In 2009, Democratic
house representative Ruth McClendon introduced a bill authorizing courts to divert people charged with misdemeanor and
state-jailable felony property crimes to mediation before a guilty
plea or conviction.258 McClendon linked popular arguments
about cost savings and docket clearing to values such as apology,
dialogue, and reparations.259 Her Democratic colleague Jim
McReynolds echoed her restorative aspirations: “If I transgress,
and it’s not a major crime, and the victim and I can get together . . . and . . . I make that restitution and this person is
willing to give forgiveness . . . couldn’t lives be redeemed and
problems be solved shy of using stiffer penalties and ultimately
state-run facilities?”260
255. DALY, supra note 250, at 43.
256. I use the term good faith as an invitation for readers to grapple with
alternative world-making visions, not as a form of interpretation that disallows
for complex human motivations, including the reality that people can hold views
that are both sincere and strategic.
257. See McLeod, supra note 4, at 667–68.
258. H.B. 2139, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009). In 2007, McClendon proposed a predecessor bill that died in committee. H.B. 2750, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Tex. 2007).
259. Hearing on H.B. 2139 Before the H. Comm. on Corrections, 81st Leg.
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009) (testimony of Rep. Ruth McClendon).
260. Id. (testimony of Rep. Jim McReynolds, Chair, H. Comm. on Corrections).
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McClendon envisioned that a mediation agreement—which
would include an apology, restitution, community service, and
potentially counseling—would result in dismissal.261 As she conceived it, however, offenders—not taxpayers—would absorb
most or all of the costs of mediation: up to $500 for program costs,
plus any counseling costs, based on the offender’s ability to
pay.262 This was a crucial provision. Prosecutors could already
divert arrested people to mediation at their discretion.263 But to
charge offenders for the value of reconciliation, they needed statutory authorization.264
Numerous actors with different political affiliations advocated for the bill over the years it was considered. For example,
the Texas Public Policy Foundation (TPPF)—a leading Kochfunded think tank devoted to small government and economic
freedom—repeatedly testified in support.265 A legislative staff
person representing an association of prosecutors described
TPPF’s position as follows:
For drug and property crimes, they don’t think the state should be locking those people up because it costs too much. They are interested in
shrinking government. That’s why they support victim-offender mediation. Why should we pay taxes and the court system to do something
when people can do it themselves?266

TPPF employee Vikrant Reddy (now a senior fellow at the
Charles Koch Institute, a Charles Koch Foundation-affiliated organization) added nuance to this position. In legislative testimony, Reddy emphasized the value of empathy. In VOM, he explained,
an offender realizes what they’ve done wrong. They begin to develop a
certain sense of empathy, and it stops feeling so indirect. . . . It’s much
easier to steal from Wal-Mart than it is to steal from a nursing home

261. H.B. 2139, art. 56.22–.23, .25.
262. Id. art. 56.25.
263. See, e.g., Hearing on H.B. 2019 Before the H. Comm. on Criminal Jurisprudence, 82d Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011) (testimony of Shannon Edmunds,
Staff Attorney, Texas District and County Attorney’s Association).
264. Id.
265. In its words, the TPPF’s “mission is to promote and defend liberty, personal responsibility, and free enterprise in Texas and the nation.” Mission, TEX.
PUB. POL’Y FOUND., https://www.texaspolicy.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/UG86
-ZDH4].
266. Shannon M. Sliva, A Tale of Two States: How U.S. State Legislatures
Consider Restorative Justice Policies, 20 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 255, 265 (2017).
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room because Wal-Mart seems so remote . . . and you sort of figure,
‘what’s the harm?’ Whenever you sit down with the person that you
stole from, the person that you victimized, you tend to feel that empathy and I think the statistics show that there is that a lot more satisfaction [from the victim].267

Reddy thus envisioned mediations based not on rational calculations and arm’s-length relations that would likely capture
how a consumer (or rather shoplifter) feels about one of the
world’s largest corporations, but rather on fellow-feeling: the
kind of affective, personal remorse that one is expected to feel
after harming an intimate caregiver. To be sure, Reddy linked
empathy to “significant savings.”268 Because VOM influences offenders and satisfies victims, he predicted the state could save
judicial and prosecutorial resources.269 “And fundamentally,” he
concluded, “[VOM] is a real tangible way of limiting the scope of
government.”270 In Reddy’s comments, the moral neoliberal and
the market neoliberal thus converge; he yoked empathy and relationality to limited government and market freedom.
Despite support from conservative and progressive organizations, McClendon’s bill stalled because of state resistance:
prosecutors demanded to decide who is eligible for mediation and
the right to request a dismissal—demands that McClendon expressed willingness to accommodate.271 In 2015, Mark Keough,
a newly elected Republican legislator, jointly authored McClendon’s revised bill.272 Support for restorative justice is an increasingly comfortable Republican position. For example, in 2012 the
Republican Party endorsed faith-based institutions specifically
for “[t]heir emphasis on restorative justice, to make the victim

267. Hearing on H.B. 2019 Before the H. Comm. on Criminal Jurisprudence,
82d Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011) (testimony of Vikrant Reddy, Senior Policy Analyst, Texas Public Policy Foundation).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. (emphasis added).
271. See, e.g., Hearing on H.B. 167 Before the H. Comm. on Criminal Jurisprudence, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013) (testimony of Rep. Ruth McClendon);
see also id. (testimony of Shannon Edmonds, Staff Attorney, Texas District and
County Attorneys Association) (“I’ll tell you frankly, this is a bill that prosecutors have killed [in] several sessions because it didn’t allow the prosecutor to
have a say in who went into the program and . . . McClendon has agreed to that
language . . . that’s great . . . .”).
272. H.B. 3184, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015).
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whole and put the offender on the right path.”273 For his part,
Keough lauded VOM for its roots in the Bible. “It’s really pretty
amazing,” he exclaimed, describing how VOM has been reported
to enhance offenders’ willingness to pay restitution.274 “And
what’s more amazing is that the people who came up with this
came up with it from an Old Testament scripture in the book of
Leviticus.”275 Here is Keough’s exegetical interpretation: “punishment should be commensurate with the crime. And cutting off
somebody’s hand [for theft] is too harsh. However, making them
pay back four times or five times based upon the value is also
fairly painful. Painful enough that people won’t continue with
that form of activity.”276 From this perspective, restitution is retributive (and deterrent), a position that reflects some of Colson’s
teachings.277
McClendon and Keough’s joint bill passed both houses in the
Republican-controlled Texas State Legislature.278 The governor,
however, vetoed it as an assault on state power.279 In his words,
“‘victim-offender mediation’ leaves out a key party in criminal
litigation—the State of Texas” (an apt reminder that on the political right, libertarian, Christian, and law-and-order positions
continue to tangle into complex configurations).280 In 2017,
273. COMM. ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE 2012 REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION, WE BELIEVE IN AMERICA: REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2012, at 38 (2012) (emphasis added), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/414158/2012
-republican-national-convention-platform.pdf [https://perma.cc/KHB8-SU6F].
274. Hearing on H.B. 3184 Before the H. Comm. on Criminal Jurisprudence,
84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015) (testimony of Rep. Mark Keough).
275. Id.
276. Id. (emphasis added).
277. Colson and Van Ness reassure their readers: “Did this mean there was
to be no punishment [in the Bible]? Not at all. Restitution was understood to be
retributive.” COLSON & VAN NESS, supra note 225, at 50. Van Ness’s own account appears more ambivalent. He reasons: “It is certainly possible to create a
criminal justice system built on restitution and requiring multiple amounts for
purposes of punishment. But the more satisfying explanation to me for the use
of different amounts in Scripture is that the fundamental requirement was simple restitution, an eye for an eye.” VAN NESS, supra note 224, at 211.
278. 84(R) History for H.B. 3184, Tᴇx. LEGISLATURE ONLINE, https://capitol
.texas.gov/billlookup/History.aspx?LegSess=84R&Bill=HB3184 [https://perma
.cc/H9JL-KACB].
279. GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF TEX., PROCLAMATION, H.B. 84-3184, Reg.
Sess. (2015), https://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/vetoes/84/hb3184.pdf#navpanes=0
[https://perma.cc/H4XU-Q7QX].
280. Id.
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Keough tried again, limiting the bill to misdemeanor property
crimes to make it more palatable.281 Keough’s bill is currently
pending.282 This example nonetheless illustrates a range of
themes emergent in restorative justice’s translations: the fusion
of restoration and punishment theories to make restorative justice less radical, its active support by libertarian reformers engaged in a broader assault on social welfare spending and (particular kinds of) state power, and the idea supported—here, by
everyone—that individual offenders rather than “society” should
bear the costs of restoration.283
Read more generally, this case also exemplifies how neoliberal penal reform rests on more than economic logics. Marketoriented discipline is alone too anemic to carry the case for
shrinking the penal state; American cultural sensibilities
around personal security and irredeemable offenders mean taxpayers are willing to pay. As the director of criminal justice programs at the Charles Koch Institute told me, “arguments about
cost savings and fiscal prudence can start a conversation, but
they don’t bring people over the finish line. Moral arguments
matter.”284 Thus when organizations like TPPF and the Charles
Koch Foundation deploy empathy and care in the service of
shrinking government, they intend for these moral-relational
values to be experienced noninstrumentally.
In 2016, the Charles Koch Foundation began funding Prison
Fellowship, continuing a strategic (and, as some have observed,

281. H.B. 72, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017). In 2016, McClendon resigned
from the House due to illness. Patrick Svitek, Former State Rep. Ruth Jones
McClendon Dies at 74, THE TEX. TRIB. (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www
.texastribune.org/2017/12/19/ruth-jones-mcclendon-former-state-rep-dies/
[https://perma.cc/H6SW-Z3XQ].
282. 85(R) History for HB 72, TEX. LEGISLATURE ONLINE, https://capitol
.texas.gov/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=85R&Bill=HB72 [https://perma
.cc/FW88-9F75] (last visited Nov. 16, 2019).
283. Indeed in 2013, Republican Senator Charles Schwertner, who boasts
that he is working “to pass one of the most conservative legislative agendas in
Texas history,” successfully amended the state’s civil mediation statute to facilitate criminal mediation for nonviolent, non-sex-related offenses including by
authorizing a user fee of up to $350. S.B. 1237, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess., 2013 Tex.
Gen. Laws 1993; Senator Charles Schwertner, TEX. SENATE, https://senate
.texas.gov/member.php?d=5 [https://perma.cc/4W6P-NEB9].
284. Interview by Amy J. Cohen with Charles Koch Foundation and Institute staff, in Arlington, Va. (Apr. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Koch Interview].
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uneasy) alliance with the religious right.285 Foundation staff explained that they view evangelical Christians (people who express deep faith in personal transformation) as crucial allies in
their broader criminal justice mission—here explicitly knitting
together the economic and the moral into the same overarching
vision.286 To be sure, the Charles Koch Foundation, a savvy and
powerful organization, may deploy whatever strategies and alliances it calculates will advance its larger political mission.287
But I think to leave the point here stands to miss a deeper understanding of some of the lived experiences of American neoliberalism. Today no one is seeking to revive restorative justice as
a form of market freedom as it was once sketched by Randy Barnett.288 To persuade citizens that they are better off with “less
state,” libertarian and conservative reformers attempt to cultivate within Americans particular moral-relational sentiments,
such as belief in grace and mutual aid. One Koch staff member,
who had formerly worked for Prison Fellowship, described how
in a restorative mediation a victim offered to help his own young
offender find employment.289 His colleagues agreed that this victim-initiated overture was an exemplary restorative aspiration.290 Here, then, reformers committed to radical forms of market freedom commend restorative justice for how it nurtures
altruistic, loving citizens.
CONCLUSION: RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND THE LEFT
At the outset of this Article, I suggested that left legal scholars have argued that there is a fundamental distinction between
decarceral programs motivated by humanitarian ideals, on the
one hand, and decarceral programs motivated primarily to cut
285. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, RETURN OF PRIVATE FOUNDATION:
CHARLES KOCH FOUNDATION (Nov. 2017), http://990s.foundationcenter.org/
990pf_pdf_archive/480/480918408/480918408_201612_990PF.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LA8W-XZHC]. On the alliance, see, for example, Paul Blumenthal,
Koch Brothers Fund Group that Contradicts Their Ideology in 2014 Election
Push, HUFFPOST (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/koch-brothers
-gay-marriage_n_6035958 [https://perma.cc/4B2B-67VU].
286. Koch Interview, supra note 284.
287. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, New Koch, NEW YORKER (Jan. 17, 2016), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/01/25/new-koch [https://perma.cc/SK3F
-Q5CU].
288. See supra notes 97–103 and accompanying text.
289. Koch Interview, supra note 284.
290. Id.
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costs, enhance efficiency, and shrink government, on the other.
From this analytical perspective, which I shorthanded as market
neoliberalism, the decarceral left criticizes the decarceral right
for reproducing market rationalities and argues that economic
discipline is both a morally impoverished and practically limited
justification to ground reform of the American penal system. I
think these arguments are significant. But I also suspect that
they reflect a common intuition: namely, that actors on the left
and right presume that value divergence is a defining distinction.
Restorative justice focuses left analysts on a different problem—namely, that of value convergence, specifically as terms
like “community,” “empathy,” and “care” travel across partisan
lines. For this reason, I suggested that when left scholars set
moral values against putatively amoral rational economics, they
stand to misapprehend how real-world actors define their own
interventions in the contemporary moment. For some libertarian
and conservative advocates of decarceration, shrinking public social services is a deeply held commitment to promoting the wellbeing of humans. Likewise, libertarian and conservative advocates may describe embracing VOM to limit the social and
political functions of government and to enhance market freedom—but through the conservation of ethical relations.
From this analytical perspective, which I called moral neoliberalism, the challenges of bipartisan collaborations are different. All sides may advocate genuinely for empathy as a principle
to order the relationships among people affected by crime, at the
same time as all sides may disagree about what empathy requires from just political, penal, and economic systems. Of
course, this argument does not mean that left criminal justice
reformers must therefore reject projects like VOM because they
are politically indeterminate, as I have illustrated, today in practice—not simply in theory. (To return to Texas, local branches of
the NAACP and the ACLU registered support for VOM legislation, motivated, I presume, to reduce the human costs of incarceration.291) But it does mean that left criminal justice reformers
291. Hearing on H.B. 167 Before the H. Comm. on Criminal Jurisprudence,
83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013); cf. JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN
229–31 (2017) (describing the benefits, as well as the costs, of finding small
points of convergence across ideological difference as a strategy to undo mass
incarceration).
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will find themselves in spaces where they are not the only ones
advancing moral-relational commitments—all sides may invoke
care, empathy, and mutual aid to deepen their own competing
political and moral world-making visions. Value convergence, I
am thus proposing, can be a risky approach to forging alliances
across political difference.
To be sure, this caution applies primarily to restorative justice collaborations unfolding within state systems. I do not intend to suggest either that moral restorative logics exhaust left
analytics in a struggle against mass incarceration, or that the
left is a coherent or singular thing. For example, the work of
Democratic legislators in Texas is not the same as social movement organizers who today also turn to restorative justice, but
from very different social locations in their struggles against
mass incarceration.
Let me therefore conclude with a sketch of new (and old)
radical left approaches to restorative justice. Today, social movement organizers aim to create spaces for healing and restoration
outside of the state by experimenting in their own neighborhoods
and communities, as they simultaneously organize to hold the
state accountable for the harms it has perpetrated against people of color and others through decades of violent punitive mechanisms. More specifically, prison-abolitionist-anti-violence feminists and collectives of women of color describe efforts to
document, concretize, and share strategies that marginalized
communities have long deployed to manage conflict not least because they simply deem it unsafe to call upon law enforcement.292 These organizers encourage dialogic responses to intimate and family violence (including child sexual assault)
through informal interventions where communities “unite[] in
holding perpetrators accountable.”293 In so doing, they aim to reclaim precisely the kinds of intimate, gendered, and sexual

292. See generally Ejeris Dixon, Building Community Safety: Practical Steps
Toward Liberatory Transformation, in WHO DO YOU SERVE, WHO DO YOU PROTECT? 161 (Maya Schenwar, Joe Macaré & Alan Yu-lan Price eds., 2016); Rachel
Herzing & Isaac Ontiveros, Making Our Stories Matter: The Storytelling & Organizing Project (STOP), in THE REVOLUTION STARTS AT HOME: CONFRONTING
INTIMATE VIOLENCE WITHIN ACTIVIST COMMUNITIES 207 (Ching-In Chen, J.
Dulani & L. L. Piepzna-Samarasinha eds., 1st ed. 2011).
293. Andrea Smith, Preface to THE REVOLUTION STARTS AT HOME, supra
note 292, at xvi. Organizers, to be sure, frequently describe the challenges of
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harms that have legitimated punitive state interventions within
many contemporary strands of liberal legalism and feminism—
and hence precisely the kinds of harms that many first generation restorativists conceded to formal adjudicatory power.294 Via
highly detailed training manuals and practical curriculums,
these radical organizers explore how community members can
instill accountability within offenders through facilitated conversations that emphasize empathic listening, relationship
building, and extensive forms of moral, material, and spiritual
reparations. And they likewise consider how the justice provided
by the state may diverge from victims’ own contextual and contingent visions of what counts as meaningful remediation.295
These organizers, however, tend not to describe their activism as “restorative justice,” conscious of its complex politics and
contemporary alliances. For example, in a report describing
community-based possibilities to address childhood sexual assault, a group called Generation Five explains:
community building: “developing community-based responses to violence cannot rely on a romanticized notion of ‘community’ that is not sexist, homophobic,
or otherwise problematic. We cannot assume that there is even an intact community to begin with. Our political task then becomes to create communities of
accountability.” Id.
294. And the kinds of harms that many feminists argue continue to demand
state-based, carceral, law-and-order responses. On resistance to restorative justice among anti-violence feminists today, see LEIGH GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A BALANCED POLICY APPROACH TO INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 92–94 (2018). For analysis of different feminist positions, see
Mimi E. Kim, From Carceral Feminism to Transformative Justice: Women-ofColor Feminism and Alternatives to Incarceration, 27 J. ETHNIC & CULTURAL
DIVERSITY IN SOC. WORK 219, 225–28 (2018).
295. See generally CREATIVE INTERVENTIONS, CREATIVE INTERVENTIONS
TOOLKIT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO STOP INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE (2012),
http://www.creative-interventions.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/CI-Toolkit
-Complete-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG9X-GVPA]; GENERATION FIVE, TOWARD TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE: A LIBERATORY APPROACH TO CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE AND OTHER FORMS OF INTIMATE AND COMMUNITY VIOLENCE (2007),
http://www.generationfive.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/G5_Toward_
Transformative_Justice-Document.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9DA-WVCM]; THE
CRITICAL RESISTANCE - INCITE! STATEMENT ON GENDER VIOLENCE AND THE
PRISON-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (2008), https://incite-national.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/08/CR-INCITE-statement-2008discussion.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4Z9E-MD65]. For work describing some of these interventions, see Alisa Bierria, Mimi E. Kim & Clarissa Rojas, Community Accountability: Emerging Movements to Transform Violence, 37 SOC. JUST. 1, no. 4, 2011–12; Leigh Goodmark,
Should Domestic Violence Be Decriminalized?, 40 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 53, 98–
101 (2017); and Kim, supra note 294, at 226–27.
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Our investigation began with a conversation about Restorative Justice
because this was the framework with which we were most familiar.
While this approach offered us a valuable starting point, we quickly
rejected Restorative Justice models because of their co-optation by the
State . . . . We also questioned the implication that a sense of justice
had been present in the past that it was possible to restore. We then
spent two years studying existing alternative models of justice—such
as Hollow Waters (a model by First Nations people in Canada), 296 INCITE,297 the Mennonite Circles of Support and Accountability,298 Navajo Peacemaking processes,299 as well as Cuba’s neighborhood Committees for the Defense of the Revolution.300

These organizers thus invoke different genealogies to describe their restorative practices and to distinguish them from
competing institutionalized approaches. To that end, they also
frequently use different terms such as “transformative justice”301

296. In 1984, the Hollow Water First Nation created an extensive community-based response to the extremely high rates of sexual and family violence
plaguing community members. For an overview of the Hollow Water model, see
THÉRÈSE LAJEUNESSE, COMMUNITY HOLISTIC CIRCLE HEALING: HOLLOW WATER FIRST NATION (1993) and RUPERT ROSS, RETURNING TO THE TEACHINGS:
EXPLORING ABORIGINAL JUSTICE 29–48 (1996).
297. INCITE! is “a national activist organization of radical feminists of color
advancing a movement to end all forms of violence against women, gender nonconforming, and trans people of color through direct action, critical dialogue,
and grassroots organizing.” Back cover to THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE
FUNDED: BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (INCITE! ed., Duke
Univ. Press 2017) (2007); see also COLOR OF VIOLENCE: THE INCITE! ANTHOLOGY (INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence ed., 2006).
298. These circles originated in the 1990s in Canada as (initially Mennoniteaffiliated) support groups to help reintegrate high-risk sex offenders into communities. See, e.g., Robin J. Wilson, Franca Cortoni & Andrew J. McWhinnie,
Circles of Support & Accountability: A Canadian National Replication of Outcome Findings, 21 SEXUAL ABUSE 412 (2009).
299. See supra note 144.
300. GENERATION FIVE, supra note 295, at 4.
301. In the North American context, Ruth Morris, a Canadian prison abolitionist, is often credited with popularizing transformative justice. See MORRIS,
supra note 145, at 3–5. Like other left restorativists, in the 1990s, Morris began
to argue that restorative justice “leaves out . . . the social causes of all events”
and doesn’t sufficiently grapple with “distributive injustice.” Id. at 4–5. She advocated for transformative justice instead. Id.; RUTH MORRIS, A PRACTICAL
PATH TO TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE (1994); Ruth Morris, Not Enough!, 12 MEDIATION Q. 285 (1995). For Zehr’s own early call for restorative justice that is
transformative, see supra note 136. See also M. Kay Harris, Transformative
Justice: The Transformation of Restorative Justice, in HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 54, at 555–65.
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or “community accountability.”302 But they draw nonetheless on
many of the same restorative ideals that animated early left
community mediation proponents and VORP advocates: that
much crime is interpersonal violence not an offence against the
state; that interpersonal and structural violence are fundamentally intertwined; that healing interpersonal relationships must
therefore include efforts to transform preexisting unjust social
conditions; that political battles for racial and economic justice
and political battles for restorative justice therefore advance
overlapping visions; that community and social responsibility
must therefore accompany personal responsibility but that personal responsibility is nonetheless crucial; and that personal responsibility should evolve through processes of restoration, not
retribution—and here with minimal or aspirationally no state
involvement or coercion.
This is informalism, delegalization, and decentralization
(and to an extent it is mediation) cast once again as
left-structural visionary politics. Organizers conjure alterative
community-based social orders as responses to racial, economic,
and social hierarchies. In so doing, they are revitalizing perhaps
the most radical and practical aims plausible to ascribe to left
restorative justice today. Namely, that while organizers wage
political battles against the state for racial and economic justice
and procedural reform, they can simultaneously create spaces
for people to opt out—that is, to manage conflict and violence by
cultivating love and forgiveness as well as armistice, separation,
and safety through relationships and forms of reparations meaningful to them.

302. Community accountability is:
[A]ny strategy to address violence, abuse or harm that creates safety,
justice, reparations, and healing, without relying on police, prisons,
childhood protective services, or any other state systems. Instead of
police and prisons, community accountability strategies depend on
something both potentially more accessible and more complicated: the
communities surrounding the person who was harmed and the person
who caused harm.
Ching-In Chen, Jai Dulani & Leah Lakshmi Piepzna-Samarasinha, Introduction to THE REVOLUTION STARTS AT HOME, supra note 292, at xxiii; see also
Bierria, Kim & Rojas, supra note 295 (collection of articles on community accountability projects); Community Accountability: Creating a Knowledge Base,
CMTY. ACCOUNTABILITY BLOG (May 26, 2012), https://
communityaccountability.wordpress.com/ [https://perma.cc/N4JJ-WQY9].
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This final example illustrates how even as virtually all restorativists emphasize community, relationality, and empathy
as definitional values, these values are simply not flexible
enough to stake a political consensus. This is because many organizers and others directly affected by the criminal justice system experience “community” and “relationality”—as strategies
and values of conflict resolution—as deeply constituted by structural inequalities and generations of racial violence. Hence what
these left restorativists want is a fundamental transformation of
unequal systems.
For many, this desire means a commitment to the state as a
crucial vehicle of social change. As Angela Davis argues, “a justice system based on reparation and reconciliation” requires
“radical transformations . . . of structures of domination,” including, she suggests, through dramatically reimagining public
education and free healthcare systems303—which, to note the obvious, is hardly the public social vision endorsed by the Charles
Koch Foundation. Braithwaite likewise describes a welfare state
as a minimum political condition to sustain successful restorative justice interventions.304
At the same time, scholars on the left have also traced how
actually existing restorative systems follow from egalitarian social and economic conditions that may emerge through voluntary
forms of social organization as much as through centralized state
systems. This is what David Graeber, in work on indigenous
American penal systems, calls “‘baseline’ communism” such as
the sharing of food and shelter so that individual autonomy and
nonsubordination are mutually guaranteed, and property arrangements where there are few opportunities to convert inequalities of wealth into power over others and hence limited incentives to pursue material self-interest and behave badly.305 Or
what Christie, based on sketches of European small-scale collectivities, describes as including social interdependence where no
social group holds a monopoly on power, and where group members share specific values such as “each human body contains a

303. ANGELA DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 107–08 (2003).
304. John Braithwaite, The New Regulatory State and the Transformation
of Criminology, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 222, 233 (2000).
305. David Graeber, The Rat’s Wisdom 15–16 (chapter in unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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sacred soul.”306 Or what Garland, invoking the work of Mary
Douglas, identifies as “extensive network[s] of insurance and
gift-giving” where mutual trust and economic security means
“restitution can reasonably be expected and relied upon.”307
From these perspectives, restorative justice can unfold through
multiple forms of social ordering that may mix voluntary exchange and community control with state interventions.308
This genealogy of American restorative justice has thus argued not that questions of criminal justice reform are intrinsically moral-relational issues invariably expressed as sentiments
such as remorse, empathy, accountability, and forgiveness. Rather, it has attempted to show how significant questions of policy, politics, and institutional design are now articulated in a
moral language—with highly contingent and divergent political
ambitions and effects. Today, the financial and human costs of
mass incarceration have produced renewed interest in restorative justice among a wide range of activists, reformers, and scholars.309 This interest, I have argued, includes a common left/right
grammar of relationality. But rather than suggest that value
convergence should therefore create new opportunities and generative alliances, I have explored instead how shared moral values can reflect deeply unshared political visions—a perspective
that critical legal scholars elide when we presuppose thoroughly
rational, atomized, individualized, and “market-based” understandings of neoliberalism.

306. NILS CHRISTIE, LIMITS TO PAIN 81–91 (1981); S. COHEN, supra note 77,
at 229.
307. GARLAND, supra note 16, at 47.
308. See generally BRAITHWAITE, supra note 11; cf. Michael C. Dorf &
Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 267 (1998).
309. Including, I should add, among American ADR scholars. For example,
in 2018, Jennifer Reynolds started a listserv for law professors interested in
criminal-side ADR. In 2019, Andrea Kupfer Schneider and Cynthia Alkon published a textbook for law students devoted to “negotiating crime.” CYNTHIA
ALKON & ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER, NEGOTIATING CRIME: PLEA BARGAINING, PROBLEM SOLVING, AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT
(2019).

